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INTRODUCTION
1

“[T]he freedom . . . of the press” specially protects the press as an
2
industry, which is to say newspapers, television stations, and the like—
so have argued some judges and scholars, such as the Citizens United v.
3
4
5
6
FEC dissenters and Justices Stewart, Powell, and Douglas. This ar1

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
One could equally say “press as an occupation,” “press as a trade,” or “press as an
institution.”
3
The dissent argued that “we learn from [the Free Press Clause] that the drafters
of the First Amendment did draw distinctions—explicit distinctions—between types of
‘speakers,’ or speech outlets or forms,” and that “[t]he text and history” of the Free
Press Clause thus “suggest[] why one type of corporation, those that are part of the
press, might be able to claim special First Amendment status.” 130 S. Ct. 876, 951 n.57
(2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Based on this, the dissent concluded that restrictions
on the Free Speech Clause rights of nonpress entities can thus be upheld without
threatening the special Free Press Clause rights of the institutional press. Id.
4
See Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975) (arguing
that the Free Press Clause should be read as specially protecting the press-as-industry
because “[t]he primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free press was . . .
to create a fourth institution outside the Government as an additional check on the
three official branches”).
5
See Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) (assuming a press-as-industry premise in arguing that “[t]he Constitution specifically selected the press . . . to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
6
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that professional journalists are constitutionally entitled to a privilege not to testify
about their sources because the press-as-industry “has a preferred position in our constitutional scheme”); see also Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927, 931-32 (1992) (endorsing Justice Stewart’s historical
2
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gument is made in many contexts: election-related speech, libel law,
the journalist’s privilege, access to government property, and more.
Some lower courts have indeed concluded that some First Amendment constitutional protections apply only to the institutional press,
and not to book authors, political advertisers, writers of letters to the
editor, professors who post material on their websites, or people who
7
are interviewed by newspaper reporters.
Sometimes, this argument is used to support weaker protection for
non-institutional-press speakers than is already given to institutional-press
speakers. At other times, it is used to support greater protection for institutional-press speakers than they already get. The argument in the latter
set of cases is that the greater protection can be limited to institutionalpress speakers, and so will undermine rival government interests less than
if the greater protection were extended to all speakers.
But other judges and scholars—including the Citizens United ma8
9
jority and Justice Brennan —have argued that the “freedom . . . of the
press” does not protect the press-as-industry, but rather protects everyone’s use of the printing press (and its modern equivalents) as a
10
technology. People or organizations who occasionally rent the techclaim); Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and
Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1505 (2007) (“The Press Clause singles out the
press as an institution entitled to special protection under the umbrella of the First
Amendment.”); Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 102729 (2011) (taking a similar view).
7
For a discussion of these cases, which involve the journalist’s privilege, libel law,
and media access to government and private property, see infra Sections VII.A-B and D.
8
130 S. Ct. at 905 (“We have consistently rejected the proposition that the institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); id. at 928 n.6 (Scalia, J., concurring) (buttressing this claim
with a discussion of the text of the Free Press Clause). For additional Supreme Court
cases so holding, see infra Section VI.B.
9
See infra note 303 (collecting such quotes from Justice Brennan and others arguing
against treating media and nonmedia libel defendants differently for First Amendment
purposes); see also cases cited infra note 321 (collecting recent lower court cases rejecting
special protection for the press-as-industry); see also David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press,
80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 446-47 (2002) (“To the generation of the Framers of the First
Amendment, ‘the press’ meant ‘the printing press.’ It referred less to a journalistic enterprise than to the technology of printing and the opportunities for communication
that the technology created. ‘Freedom of the press’ referred to the freedom of the people to publish their views, rather than the freedom of journalists to pursue their craft.”).
10
I speak here of communications technologies that today serve the role the printing press did in the 1700s, not just of the printing press as such. “It is not strange that
‘press,’ the word for what was then the sole means of broad dissemination of ideas and
news, would be used to describe the freedom to communicate with a large, unseen audience,” even using new technologies that were not known to the Framers. First Nat’l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 800 n.5 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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nology, for instance by buying newspaper space, broadcast time, or
the services of a printing company, are just as protected as newspaper
11
publishers or broadcasters.
Under this approach, the First Amendment rights of the institutional
press and of other speakers rise and fall together. Sometimes, this approach is used to support protection for non-institutional-press speakers
and to resist calls for lowering that protection below the level offered to
institutional-press speakers. At other times, it is used to rebut demands
for greater protection: Extending such protection to all speakers, the argument goes, would excessively undermine rival government interests—
yet allowing such protection only for the institutional press would im12
properly give the institutional press special rights.
Both sides in the debate often appeal at least partly to the constitutional text and its presumed original meaning. The words “the press”
in the First Amendment must mean the institutional press, says one
side. The words must mean press-as-technology, says the other. Citizens
United is unlikely to settle the question, given how sharply the four dissenters and many outside commentators have disagreed with the majority. So who is right? What light does the “history” referred to by the Cit13
14
izens United dissent shed on the “text” and the Framers’ “purpose”?
The answer, it turns out, is that people during the Framing era
likely understood the text as fitting the press-as-technology model—as
securing the right of every person to use communications technology,
and not just securing a right belonging exclusively to members of the
publishing industry. The text was likely not understood as treating
the press-as-industry differently from other people who wanted to rent
or borrow the press-as-technology on an occasional basis.
Parts I, II, and III set forth the evidence on this subject from the
Framing era and the surrounding decades. Part I discusses, among
other things, early reference works and state constitutions that de-

The printing press itself was understood during the Framing era as a technological innovation, and existing rights were understood as being adaptable to technological innovations. See THOMAS HAYTER, AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS CHIEFLY AS IT
REFLECTS PERSONAL SLANDER 3-4 (London, J. Raymond 1754); FRANCIS LUDLOW
HOLT, THE LAW OF LIBEL 38-39 (photo. reprint 1978) (1812).
11
Alternatively, one could conclude that people who rent such access become
members of the press-as-industry for those occasions. But then the results would be the
same as under the press-as-technology view, because anyone who occasionally uses the
press as a technology would be treated the same as members of the press-as-industry.
12
See, e.g., cases cited infra Section VI.B.
13
See supra note 3.
14
See Stewart, supra note 4, at 634.
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scribed the freedom of the press as a right of “every freeman,” “every
man,” or “every citizen.” This right was generally seen as the right to
publish using mass technology, as opposed to the freedom of speech,
which was seen at the time as focusing more on in-person speech.
Part II discusses the Framing-era understanding that the freedom of
the press extended to authors of books and pamphlets—authors who
15
were generally not members of the press-as-industry, though they did
use the press as technology. Part III goes on to discuss fifteen cases
from 1784 to 1840 that treated the freedom of the press as extending
equally to all people who used press technology, and not just to members of the press-as-industry. To my knowledge, these cases have not
been discussed before in this context. Each of the sources standing
alone may not be dispositive. But put together, they point powerfully
toward the press-as-technology reading, under which all users of mass
communications technologies have the same freedom of the press.
Part IV turns to how the “freedom . . . of the press” was understood
around 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. Much recent scholarship has suggested that originalist analyses of Bill of Rights
provisions applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment should
consider the original understanding as of 1868 in addition to that of
16
1791. And it turns out that around 1868, it was even clearer that the
“freedom . . . of the press” secured a right to use the press-astechnology, with no special protection for the press-as-industry. Part V
offers evidence that this remained true from 1880 to 1930.
Part VI then looks at how the Supreme Court has understood
“freedom . . . of the press” since 1931, the first year that the Court
struck down government action on First Amendment grounds.
Throughout that time, the press-as-technology view has continued to
be dominant. Many Supreme Court cases have officially endorsed this
view. No Supreme Court case has rejected this view, though some
cases have suggested the question remains open.
Part VII turns to how the “freedom . . . of the press” has been understood by lower courts since 1931, and concludes that the press-astechnology view has been dominant there as well. The first lower
court decisions I could find adopting the press-as-industry view did not
15

See infra Section II.A.
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 145, 175-77 (2008); Sanford Levinson, Superb History, Dubious Constitutional and Political Theory: Comments on Uviller and Merkel, The Militia and the Right to Arms, 12 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 315, 327-30 (2004) (book review); Stephen A. Siegel, Injunctions for Defamation, Juries, and the Clarifying Lens of 1868, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 655, 659-63 (2008).
16
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appear until the 1970s. Even since then, only a handful of cases have
adopted such a view, and many more have rejected it. (The press-asindustry cases that this Part identifies could also be helpful as test cases for any future work that discusses the policy advantages and disadvantages of the press-as-industry model.)
None of the evidence I describe specifically deals with corporations, the particular speakers involved in Citizens United, but it does
show that the institutional media has historically been seen as the
equal of other people and organizations for purposes of the “freedom . . . of the press.” The constitutional protections offered to the
institutional media have long been understood—in the early republic,
around 1868, from 1868 to 1970, and in the great bulk of cases since
1970 as well—as being no greater than those offered to others.
Finally, the Conclusion briefly discusses what effect this analysis
should have on the Court’s interpretation of the Free Press Clause.
Of course, text, original meaning, tradition, and precedent have never
been the Supreme Court’s sole guides. But any calls for specially protecting the press-as-industry have to look to sources other than text,
original meaning, tradition, and precedent for support.
I. EVIDENCE FROM AROUND THE FRAMING: THE FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS AS A RIGHT OF “EVERY FREEMAN”
A. Cases, Treatises, and Constitutions
Early formulations of the freedom of the press spoke of it as a
right of every “freeman,” “citizen,” or “individual.” These formulations often set forth narrow substantive views of the “freedom of the
press.” But, whatever the scope of the right, it belonged to everyone
(or at least all free citizens).
Blackstone, for instance, wrote in 1769 that “[e]very freeman has an
undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public:
17
to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press.” Jean-Louis de
Lolme, an author widely cited by 1780s American writers, likewise
wrote in his chapter on “Liberty of the Press” that “[e]very subject in
England has not only a right to present petitions, to the King, or the
Houses of Parliament; but he has a right also to lay his complaints and
17

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151 (emphasis added); see also David
Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REV. 77, 99 (1975) (“The emphasis in
‘freedom of the press’ was upon unrestrained dissemination of thought and the right
belonged not merely to ‘the press’ but to ‘every free man.’”).
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observations before the Public, by the means of an open press.” The
right to present petitions, of course, was not limited to the press as an
industry, but really did belong to “[e]very subject.” De Lolme’s explanation suggests that the right to speak to the public via “an open
press” likewise extended to all subjects, whether or not they used the
printing press for a living.
State supreme courts in 1788 and 1791 similarly described the lib19
erty of the press as “permitting every man to publish his opinions,”
and as meaning that “the citizen has a right to publish his sentiments
20
upon all political, as well as moral and literary subjects.” Justice Iredell described the liberty of the press in 1799 as meaning that “[e]very
freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases be21
fore the public.” St. George Tucker, in 1803, defined the “freedom
of the press” as meaning that “[e]very individual, certainly, has a right
22
to speak, or publish, his sentiments on the measures of government.”
Several early state constitutions echoed this as well, providing that
“[e]very citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject, being re23
sponsible for the abuse of that liberty.” Likewise, Justice Story, who
18

J. L. DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 280 (London, T. Spilsbury
1775) (emphasis added). De Lolme is tied for third on Donald Lutz’s list of the mostcited authors in 1780s American political writing, behind Blackstone and Montesquieu, and tied with Cesare Beccaria and with Trenchard and Gordon of Cato’s Letters.
Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 189, 193 (1984).
19
Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319, 325 (Pa. 1788) (emphasis added).
20
Commonwealth v. Freeman, HERALD OF FREEDOM (Boston), Mar. 18, 1791, at 5
(Mass. 1791) (emphasis added).
21
In re Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 839 (Iredell, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No.
5126) (grand jury charge) (emphasis added) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151).
22
2 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. 28 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, William
Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803) [hereinafter TUCKER] (emphasis added).
23
PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 7 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., DEL. CONST. of
1792, art. I, § 5 (“The press shall be free to every citizen, who undertakes to examine
the official conduct of men acting in a public capacity; and any citizen may print on
any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.”); KY. CONST. of 1792, art.
XII, § 7 (“[P]rinting presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine
the proceedings of the Legislature or any branch of Government . . . and every citizen
may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of
that liberty.”); Sovchik v. Roberts, No. 3090-M, 2001 WL 490015, at *3 n.1 (Ohio Ct.
App. May 9, 2001) (interpreting similar provision in Ohio Constitution and concluding that “the plain language of the constitutional provision ‘[e]very citizen’ cannot
reasonably be construed as applying only to members of the media”), quoted approvingly
in Wampler v. Higgins, 752 N.E.2d 962, 972 (Ohio 2001).
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wrote in 1833 but who had learned the law in the decade following the
enactment of the Bill of Rights, described the First Amendment as
providing that “every man shall have a right to speak, write, and print his
opinions upon any subject whatsoever, without any prior restraint, so
always, that he does not injure any other person . . . or attempt to sub24
vert the government.” These references to a right of “every freeman,”
“every man,” “every citizen,” and “every individual” appear to refer to
every person’s right to use printing technology. They are much less
consistent with the notion that the right gave special protection to the
few men who were members of a particular industry.
Some early state constitutions mentioned both the “every citizen”
25
phrase and, separately, the “liberty of speech, or of the press,” but as
the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 shows, these formulations did
not describe separate rights. The Pennsylvania text read, “That the
people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments: therefore the freedom of the press ought not to
26
be restrained,” which suggests that the freedom of the press was a restatement of the right of “the people” to publish.
Early cases, such as the 1803 Runkle v. Meyer decision, likewise treat
the “liberty of the press” as equivalent to the provision that “every citi27
zen may freely speak, write and print on any subject.”
And St.
24

3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
732 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833) (emphasis added). Noah Webster’s influential
1828 American dictionary likewise defined “liberty of the press” as “the free right of publishing books, pamphlets or papers without previous restraint; or the unrestrained right
which every citizen enjoys of publishing his thoughts and opinions, subject only to punishment for publishing what is pernicious to morals or to the peace of the state.” 2 NOAH
WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York, S. Converse
1828) (under “press”). Another definition in the same dictionary, listed under “liberty,”
was much the same: “freedom from any restriction on the power to publish books; the
free power of publishing what one pleases, subject only to punishment for abusing the
privilege, or publishing what is mischievous to the public or injurious to individuals.” Id.
25
See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. 1, §§ 5–6 (protecting the right of “[e]very
citizen [to] write and publish his sentiment on all subjects” and prohibiting any law
from “curtail[ing] or restrain[ing] the liberty of speech or of the press”); N.Y. CONST.
of 1821, art. 7, § VIII (“Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments, on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be
passed, to restrain, or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press.”).
26
PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. I, para. XII. For a discussion of three New York court
cases that were decided within a few years of the enactment of article 7, section VIII of
the New York Constitution of 1821 and take the press-as-technology view, see infra subsections III.B.3-4 and III.C.2.
27
See 3 Yeates 518, 519 (Pa. 1803) (quoting the Pennsylvania Constitution’s statement that “every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject” in explaining
what the court saw as the proper understanding of “liberty of the press”).
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George Tucker, Chancellor Kent, and Justice Joseph Story all treated
the First Amendment phrase “freedom of the speech, and of the
press” as interchangeable with the state constitutional provisions that
28
“every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments.”
B. The Structure of the Framing-Era Newspaper Industry
The view that “freedom of the press” covers “every citizen,” even
people who aren’t members of the publishing industry, also makes
sense given how many important authors of the time were not members of that industry.
Newspapers of the era were small enterprises, with few or no em29
ployees. Woodward and Bernstein were many decades in the future;
30
Framing-era newspapers didn’t do sustained investigative journalism.
And while those newspapers doubtless contributed facts and opinions to public debate, some of the most important such contributions
in newspapers came from people who were not publishers, printers,
editors, or their employees—Madison, Hamilton, and Jay’s The Federal-

28

2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 14 (New York, O. Halsted
1827); see also 3 STORY, supra note 24, at 732-33; 2 TUCKER, supra note 22, app. 11-14.
The Justices have often accepted these treatises as evidence of the original meaning of
the Constitution. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 799
(1995); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 977, 982 (1991) (Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J.); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 29 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
The sources discussed in the text also suggest that the change from Madison’s
proposed constitutional amendment—“the people shall not be deprived or abridged
of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the
press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable,” 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
434 (1789) ( J oseph Gales ed., 1834)—to the briefer First Amendment language
(“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press”)
was not understood as affecting the substance of the protection. The freedom of
speech or of the press was seen as equivalent to the people’s right to speak, to write, or
to publish their sentiments.
29
See, e.g., FREDERIC HUDSON, JOURNALISM IN THE UNITED STATES FROM 1690 TO
1872, at 136 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1873) (noting that printers and editors of the
era lacked a “staff of paid writers”); FRANK LUTHER MOTT, AMERICAN JOURNALISM: A
HISTORY OF NEWSPAPERS IN THE UNITED STATES THROUGH 250 YEARS, 1690 TO 1940, at
115-16 (1941) (describing how the publisher of the first American daily newspaper
“[u]ndoubtedly . . . did all the work on his paper himself during at least part of [1783–
1784], even . . . selling it on the street”).
30
See Anderson, supra note 9, at 446-47 (“The concept of press as journalism cannot claim a historical pedigree. When the First Amendment was written, journalism as
we know it did not exist. The press in the eighteenth century was a trade of printers,
not journalists.”).
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31

ist essays are a classic example. “[N]ot a few of the country editors . . . depended for what literary work their vocation demanded upon the assistance of friends who liked being ‘contributors to the press’
32
without fee.”
It seems unlikely that the Framers would have secured a special
right limited to this small industry, an industry that included only part
of the major contributors to public debate. This is especially so given
that some of the most powerful and wealthy contributors, such as the
politicians and planters who wrote so much of the important published
material, weren’t part of the industry. Some eighteenth-century American political figures—such as the young Benjamin Franklin and Representative Matthew Lyon, one of the targets of a Sedition Act prosecution—were indeed newspapermen, but they were rare exceptions.
Political elites sometimes secure rights for themselves. They
sometimes secure rights for the whole public. But it seems unlikely
that they would have secured rights for a class of tradesmen who were
generally poorer and less powerful than the elites, and would have
denied those rights to themselves and to people of their class. Rather,
as William Livingston—who later became a governor of New Jersey
and a delegate to the Constitutional Convention—wrote in his 1753
essay titled Of the Use, Abuse, and Liberty of the Press, one of the great
benefits provided by “the Art of Printing” and “the Invention of the
Press” is that “the Press” could be used by “Writers of every Character
and Genius,” including “[t]he Patriot,” “[t]he Divine” (i.e., the clergyman), “the Philosopher, the Moralist, the Lawyer, and Men of every
other Profession and Character, whose Sentiments may be diffused
33
with the greatest Ease and Dispatch.”
To be sure, the Framers praised newspapers, sometimes extravagantly so; consider Jefferson’s statement that, “were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or
31

Nor were these statements necessarily endorsed by the newspaper publishers to
the point that they could be seen as an expression of the publishers’ own views. See,
e.g., PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–
1788, at 70-75 (2010) (describing the public pressures that kept many anti-Federalist
essays from being published, and describing how some tried to counteract those pressures by publishing the materials without endorsing them as their own opinions).
32
MOTT, supra note 29, at 162; see also DONALD H. STEWART, THE OPPOSITION
PRESS OF THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 20 (1969) (stating, in reference to American newspapers of that era generally, that “[s]ubscribers’ pens provided a large proportion of
the items in these gazettes,” mostly “discuss[ing] political subjects”).
33
William Livingston, Of the Use, Abuse, and Liberty of the Press, INDEP. REFLECTOR,
Aug. 30, 1753, reprinted in THE INDEPENDENT REFLECTOR 336, 336-37 (Milton M. Klein
ed., 1963).
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newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to
34
prefer the latter.” But Jefferson spoke of newspapers, not newspapermen. There is no reason to think his praise, or the Free Press
Clause, excluded newspapers as a means of propagating the views of
authors who weren’t part of the press-as-industry but who occasionally
submitted their articles for publication.
It’s theoretically conceivable that a right of “every person” to publish using the press might refer only to the right of every person—
including Livingston’s clergyman, philosopher, moralist, or lawyer—to
buy a printing press and to start printing using that press, or perhaps
to start a regular newspaper published on someone else’s press. Once
a person buys the press or starts a newspaper, the theory would go,
what the person publishes with it would be protected by the freedom
of the press. But until then, the freedom of the press does not cover
any article the person submits to a newspaper, or any leaflet that the
person pays a printer to print.
This, though, seems like an odd understanding of the “undoubted
right” of “[e]very freeman” “to lay what sentiments he pleases before
35
the public.” Buying a press and hiring a printer to operate it—or
starting a newspaper and hiring an editor—was an expensive and
cumbersome means of laying your sentiments before the public.
Indeed, even rich and influential American politicians did not
take such steps. If they wanted to publish something, they would
submit it to a newspaper (for a famous example, consider Madison,
Hamilton, and Jay’s The Federalist), or help pay for its publication as a
pamphlet (as Hamilton did for the second edition of The Federalist,
36
and as Thomas Paine did for Common Sense).
Again, one can imagine a notion of the “undoubted right” of
“[e]very freeman” “to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public” under which those publications were not seen as protected by the
author’s freedom of the press—so that authors who really wanted such
protection (for instance, against a libel lawsuit, libel prosecution, or
injunction) had to buy their own presses or start their own newspapers, which they almost never did. But the cases, commentaries, and
34

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Colonel Edward Carrington ( J an. 16, 1787), in
2 MEMOIRS, CORRESPONDENCE, AND PRIVATE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 84, 85
(Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., London, Henry Colburn & Richard Bentley 1829).
35
See supra note 17.
36
See infra note 69. In the early republic, a few politicians helped fund partisan
newspapers. But this was done by only a few political leaders, and I have seen no reason
to think that it was done to get the politicians special protections against legal liability.
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Framing-era practice do not suggest that anyone at the time had such
an odd understanding of what “[e]very freeman[’s]” “right” meant.
C. The (Possibly) Dissenting Sources
I have found only two early sources that could be read as supporting a view that the liberty of the press might belong only to printers or
newspaper publishers, though both include language that points in
both directions.
The first source is Francis Ludlow Holt’s The Law of Libel (1812),
which says that “[t]he liberty of the press . . . is only one of the per37
sonal rights of the printer.” But other parts of the same chapter suggest that Holt viewed the right as belonging to authors—including
ones who aren’t printers or their employees—and not just printers.
Two pages later, Holt defines “[t]he liberty of the press” as “the
personal liberty of the writer to express his thoughts in the more
[im]proved way invented by human ingenuity in the form of the
38
press.” He likewise describes the “liberty of the press” as “what is
necessarily included in its equivalent and progressive terms, thinking,
39
speaking, and writing,” as “one of the forms of the liberty of speech
40
and communication,” and later in the book as “[t]he natural liberty
of the people” to engage in “opinion, . . . inquiry, and . . . discussion”
41
about Parliament. And Holt notes that “with a very few exceptions,
whatever any one has a right both to think and to speak, he has like42
wise a consequential right to print and to publish.” This seems more
consistent with all speakers’ and writers’ right to express their views
using the press-as-technology, rather than with a right limited to the
few people who are members of the press-as-industry.
The second source is a civics schoolbook called First Lessons in Civil
Government (1843), in which the author writes, with regard to the New
York Constitution,
The section which remains to be noticed, is that which secures to all the
right “freely to speak, write, and publish their sentiments;” that is, the lib37

HOLT, supra note 10, at 36.
Id. at 38 (emphasis added). The original reads “the more approved,” but the
author must have meant “the more improved,” and the 1816 revision makes that correction. FRANCIS LUDLOW HOLT, THE LAW OF LIBEL 51 (London, J. Butterworth et al.
2d ed. 1816).
39
HOLT, supra note 10, at 37.
40
Id. at 45.
41
Id. at 128.
42
Id. at 46-47.
38
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erty of speech and of the press. A press is a machine for printing; but the
word is also used to signify the business of printing and publishing;
hence liberty of the press is the free right to publish books or papers
43
without restraint.

This too is ambiguous. The first sentence speaks of a right of “all,”
and the “free right to publish books or papers” could be read as a
right of all, since “publishing” was a general term for what authors did
44
and not just for what printers did. But the “business of printing and
publishing” clause suggests that the right is limited to those in the
press-as-industry.
Yet however one reads these two sources, I think they do not overcome the evidence of the other sources mentioned earlier in this Part,
45
coupled with the sources discussed below.
D. The Grammatical Structure of “the Freedom of Speech, or of the Press”
The grammatical structure of the First Amendment likewise suggests that the freedom was the freedom “of every freeman” or “every
citizen” to use the press-as-technology, and not a freedom belonging to
the press-as-industry.
As Justice Scalia pointed out in Citizens United, the shared words
“freedom of” in the phrase the “freedom of speech, or of the press”
are most reasonably understood as playing the same role for both
46
“speech” and “press.” The “freedom of speech” is freedom to engage
in an activity, much like “freedom of movement” or “freedom of religion.” In particular, it is the freedom to use the faculty of speech.
43

ANDREW W. YOUNG, FIRST LESSONS IN CIVIL GOVERNMENT: INCLUDING A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 155 (Auburn, N.Y.,
H. & J.C. Ivison 10th ed. 1843) (citing N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. 7, § VIII). Another
edition says, with regard to the Ohio Constitution, that “the liberty of speech and of the
press” is the right “to speak, write, or print upon any subject, as he thinks proper . . . .
The word press here signifies the business of printing and publishing; hence liberty of
the press is the right to publish books and papers without restraint.” ANDREW W.
YOUNG, FIRST LESSONS IN CIVIL GOVERNMENT: INCLUDING A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF OHIO 139 (Cleveland, M.C. Younglove 1848) (citing OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 6).
44
See Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the Original Meaning of the First
Amendment, 97 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1081-82 (2009) (explaining the Framing-era understanding that “publishing” meant communicating something to the public).
45
See infra Parts II and III.
46
See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 928 n.6 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that “no one” thought the First Amendment meant “everyone’s right to speak
or the institutional press’s right to publish”); Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42
GA. L. REV. 309, 345-46 (2008) (“The construction makes it likely that the Framers
meant ‘of speech’ and ‘of the press’ to be interpreted in a parallel manner.”).
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This suggests that “freedom of the press” is likewise freedom to engage in an activity by using the faculty of the printing press.
This is supported by sources that discuss the “freedom in the use of
the press.” Thus, James Madison, in his 1800 Report on the Virginia Resolutions, wrote that American law provided “a different degree of free47
dom in the use of the press” than English law did. The Massachusetts response to the Virginia resolutions replied that the “freedom of
the press” “is a security for the rational use, and not the abuse of the
48
press.” St. George Tucker’s influential 1803 work, in discussing the
freedom of the press, spoke of “[w]hoever makes use of the press as
49
the vehicle of his sentiments on any subjects.” The freedom of the
press was “freedom in the use of the press,” much as freedom of
speech was freedom in the use of speech.
Likewise, Madison’s Report also quoted a phrase from Virginia’s
ratifying convention: “We, the Delegates of the people of Virginia . . .
declare and make known . . . that among other essential rights, the
liberty of conscience and of the press cannot be cancelled, abridged,
50
restrained or modified by any authority of the United States.” Again,
the phrase “the liberty of” is seen as applying equally to “conscience”
and “the press.” Here too this suggests that, just as the liberty of conscience was seen during that era as each person’s freedom to worship
51
or to think and speak as he wished on religious matters, so the liberty
52
of the press meant each person’s freedom to publish.

47

JAMES MADISON, REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES (1800), reprinted in 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 570 ( J onathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]; see also Lee, supra
note 46, at 342 (“The inclusion of the word ‘use’ in . . . ‘freedom in the use of the
press’ makes it unmistakably clear that Madison . . . w[as] referring to the machine of
the printing press.”).
48
Reply of the Legislature to Resolutions of the State of Virginia, ch. 119, 1798
Gen. Court, Jan. Sess. (Mass. 1799), 1798–1799 Mass. Acts 257, 260, reprinted in 4
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 47, at 533, 535.
49
2 TUCKER, supra note 22, app. 29.
50
MADISON, supra note 47, at 576 (quoting Form of Ratification, 1788 Ratifying
Convention (Va. 1788), reprinted in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 47, at 656).
51
See N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII (treating “liberty of conscience” as synonymous with “the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship”);
HORTENSIUS [GEORGE HAY], AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 41 (Philadelphia,
The Aurora Office 1799) (defining the constitutional “freedom of religion” “to mean
the power uncontrolled by law of professing and publishing any opinions on religious
topics, which any individual may choose to profess or publish, and of supporting those
opinions by any statements he may think proper to make”). George Hay was appointed U.S. Attorney for the District of Virginia in 1803 and eventually finished his career
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Of course, “freedom of” is also sometimes used in the possessive
sense to refer to the freedom of a particular group. One might, for
53
instance, speak of “the freedom of Americans to speak,” or “the free54
dom of Catholics to practice their religion.”
But writers generally don’t yoke together two such different meanings with the same words: it would be odd for “the freedom of” in
“the freedom of speech, or of the press” to mean one thing in the first
part of the phrase (i.e., everyone’s freedom to use the faculty of
speech) and a different thing in the second part (i.e., the freedom be55
longing to a particular group, the press-as-industry).
And as the
sources mentioned in Part III suggest, the First Amendment was not
read in this odd way—the freedom of the press was understood as the
freedom of everyone to publish, just as the freedom of speech was the
freedom of everyone to speak.

as a federal judge. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Hay, George, FED. JUD. CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1006 (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
52
“Freedom of the press” was also sometimes yoked with “licentiousness of the
press,” but “licentiousness of the press” was understood as including publications by
people who were using the press-as-technology, and not just by members of the pressas-industry. Thus, for instance, Judge Mansfield’s oft-quoted statement that “[t]he liberty of the press consists in printing without any previous license, subject to the consequences of law” while “[t]he licentiousness of the press is Pandora’s box, the source of
every evil” came in his opinion justifying the conviction of a clergyman who had published a pamphlet using the press-as-technology, but who was not a member of the
press-as-industry. R v. Shipley (The Dean of St. Asaph’s Case), (1784) 99 Eng. Rep. 774
(K.B.) 824; 4 Dougl. 73, 170; see also infra subsection III.A.1. Likewise, Judge Chase’s
statement that the Sedition Act was “a law to check this licentiousness of the press”
came in charging the jury in Thomas Cooper’s trial for publishing a leaflet, not a
newspaper article. United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 639 (Chase, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865); see also infra subsection III.B.1. Cato’s Letters similarly
argued that oppressors “have been loud in their Complaints against Freedom of
Speech, and the Licence of the Press; and always restrained, or endeavoured to restrain, both. In consequence of this, they have brow-beaten Writers, punished them
violently, and against Law, and burnt their Works.” 1 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS
GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS 101-02 (London, W. Wilkins et al. 4th ed. 1737). This is a
reference to the alleged licentiousness of books (books being more commonly burned
than newspapers) used as a reason to punish writers of books, and isn’t limited to the
alleged licentiousness of the institutional press.
53
E.g., Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 667 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
54
E.g., James Lowell Underwood, The Dawn of Religious Freedom in South Carolina:
The Journey from Limited Tolerance to Constitutional Right, 54 S.C. L. REV. 111, 151 (2002).
55
See Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (2003) (“Absent some very strong reason to
the contrary, we should conclude that a word or phrase in a particular clause or sentence has the same meaning throughout the clause or sentence.”).
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E. Responding to the Redundancy Objection
The freedom of the press-as-technology, of course, was not seen as
56
redundant of the freedom of speech. St. George Tucker, for instance, discussed the freedom of speech as focusing on the spoken
word and the freedom of the press as focusing on the printed:
The best speech cannot be heard, by any great number of persons. The
best speech may be misunderstood, misrepresented, and imperfectly
remembered by those who are present. To all the rest of mankind, it is,
as if it had never been. The best speech must also be short for the investigation of any subject of an intricate nature, or even a plain one, if it be
of more than ordinary length. The best speech then must be altogether
inadequate to the due exercise of the censorial power, by the people.
The only adequate supplementary aid for these defects, is the absolute
57
freedom of the press.

Likewise, George Hay, who later became a U.S. Attorney and a federal
judge, wrote in 1799 that “freedom of speech means, in the construction of the Constitution, the privilege of speaking any thing without
control” and “the words freedom of the press, which form a part of
the same sentence, mean the privilege of printing any thing without
58
control.” Massachusetts Attorney General James Sullivan (1801) similarly treated “the freedom of speech” as referring to “utter[ing], in
words spoken,” and “the freedom of the press” as referring to
59
“print[ing] and publish[ing].”
And these sources captured an understanding that was broadly
expressed during the surrounding decades. Bishop Thomas Hayter,
writing in 1754, described the “Liberty of the Press” as applying the
56

Justice Stewart argued that the Free Press Clause should be read as protecting
the press-as-industry since otherwise it would be a “constitutional redundancy.” Stewart, supra note 4, at 633-34; see also West, supra note 6, at 1040-41 (likewise).
57
2 TUCKER, supra note 22, app. 17. Tucker suggested that other material—such
as pictures, symbolic expression, and writing—would be protected as well. Id. at 11-14;
see also sources cited supra note 28. But since in-person speech and printing were the
most common subjects of suppression, and of debates about constitutional protection,
Tucker naturally focused on those two matters.
58
HORTENSIUS, supra note 51, at 40-41.
59
AN IMPARTIAL CITIZEN [JAMES SULLIVAN], A DISSERTATION UPON THE CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 17 (Boston, David Carlisle 1801). Sullivan used those phrases in ridiculing an overexpansive view of
the First Amendment, in which the freedom of the press was read as entirely unlimited; he was arguing for the freedom as being limited to examination of public matters,
and not to personal slanders. But in the process he was treating “freedom of speech”
as referring to the freedom to use spoken words, to whatever extent that might be
properly limited, and the “freedom of the press” as referring to the freedom to use
printing technology.
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traditionally recognized “Use and Liberty of Speech” to “Printing,” an
activity that Hayter described as “only a more extensive and improved
60
Kind of Speech.” Hayter’s work was known and quoted in Revolu61
tionary-era America.
Similarly, William Bollan (1766) described “printing” as “a species
of writing invented for the more expeditious multiplication of copies,”
and asserted that “freedom or restraint of speech and writing upon
public affairs have generally been concomitant”; because of this, Bollan
argued, “restraints of writing” were likely to erode the “liberty of
speech” and not only of writing, and “those who desire to preserve the
[liberty of speech] ought by all means to take due care of the [freedom
62
of writing].” And Bollan used “liberty of the press” and “the freedom
63
of writing” (in a context suggesting printing) interchangeably.
Later, Francis Holt (1812) defined the liberty of the press as “the
personal liberty of the writer to express his thoughts in the more
[im]proved way invented by human ingenuity in the form of the
64
press.” William Rawle (1825) likewise characterized “[t]he press” as
“a vehicle of the freedom of speech,” adding that “[t]he art of printing illuminates the world, by a rapid dissemination of what would oth65
erwise be slowly communicated and partially understood.”
Without the freedom of the press, the freedom of speech might
not have been viewed as covering printing, given that printing posed
dangers that ordinary “speech” did not. Indeed, in the centuries before the Framing, governments tried to specifically constrain the use
of the press-as-technology because they found it to be especially
dangerous. The free press guarantees made clear that this potential-

60

HAYTER, supra note 10, at 8.
See, e.g., Civis, Letter to the Editor, VA. GAZETTE, May 18, 1776, at 1 (“Printing is
a more extensive and improved kind of speech.”); Letter to the Editor, PA. PACKET &
DAILY ADVERTISER, Nov. 12, 1785, at 2 (same); London, Nov. 7, MASS. GAZETTE, Jan. 30,
1786, at 1 (same); London, Oct. 29, CONN. J., Jan. 4, 1786, at 1 (same).
62
WILLIAM BOLLAN, THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND WRITING UPON PUBLIC AFFAIRS,
CONSIDERED 3-4 (London, S. Baker 1766). Bollan was “a distinguished Massachusetts
lawyer who served the colony as its advocate general and then as its agent in England,
[and] earned John Adams’ praise as ‘a faithful friend of America.’” FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 83 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1966). Bollan’s work was
quoted in American free press debates shortly before the Revolution. Id. at 84.
63
BOLLAN, supra note 62, at 137.
64
HOLT, supra note 10, at 38; see also Lee, supra note 46, at 344-45 (quoting id.).
65
WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 119 (Philadelphia, H.C. Carey & I. Lea 1825).
61
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ly dangerous technology was protected alongside direct in-person
66
communications.
Of course, over the last several decades, the phrase “freedom of
speech” has often been used to mean “freedom of expression” and to
encompass all means of communication. This might have stemmed
partly from technological change. New media of communication such
as radio, films, television, and the Internet may fit more naturally in lay
English within the term “speech” rather than “press.” And once some
mass communication technologies are labeled “speech,” it becomes easier to label their traditional print equivalent “speech” as well.
The broadening of the phrase “freedom of speech” might also
have been aided by the success of the “freedom of the press” clause in
67
assuring protection for the press-as-technology. Once constitutional
law applies the same legal rules to spoken and printed communication, with no extra constraint on the press, it becomes easier to use a
common label to refer to the common protection.
But the canon against interpreting legal writings in a way that
makes one clause redundant of another rests on the notion that the
authors and ratifiers of those writings wouldn’t have written something that was redundant under their understanding. And under the late
1700s understanding, the freedom of the press-as-technology was not
at all redundant of the freedom of speech.
II. EVIDENCE FROM AROUND THE FRAMING: THE FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS COVERING AUTHORS OF BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS
Any Framing-era understanding limiting the “freedom of the
press” to the press-as-industry is especially unlikely, given the thenexisting understanding that the freedom protected books and pamphlets alongside newspapers.
A. The Non-Press-as-Industry Status of Many
Book and Pamphlet Authors
Books and pamphlets of that era were written largely by scientists,
philosophers, planters, ministers, politicians, and ordinary citizens, ra66

See Anthony Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595,
599-600 (1979) (so arguing); William W. Van Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a “Preferred Position,” 28 HASTINGS L.J. 761, 769 n.16 (1977) (likewise).
67
Cf. David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 458
(1983) (explaining that when the Court’s early First Amendment “cases were decided,
the existence of a press clause may have been crucial”).
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ther than by members of the institutional press. In the words of Benjamin Rush—a leading American physician and intellectual—writing
in 1790, “Our authors and scholars are generally men of business, and
make their literary pursuits subservient to their interests. . . . Men,
who are philosophers or poets, without other pursuits, had better end
68
their days in an old country.”
Some books of the era were funded by printers who were members
69
of the press-as-industry. Others were funded by authors themselves, by
70
ideological groups, or by “subscribers” who supported the cost of pro71
duction by paying the printer up front for printing the book. Some
books were likely published with hope of profit, and others chiefly out

68

BENJAMIN RUSH, ESSAYS, LITERARY, MORAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 190 (Philadelphia, Thomas & William Bradford 2d ed. 1806); see also ROLLO G. SILVER, THE AMERICAN PRINTER, 1787–1825, at 97 (1967) (“Printed authors were of necessity amateurs
with some dependable [outside] income.”).
69
See CHARLES A. MADISON, BOOK PUBLISHING IN AMERICA 6 (1966) (“Until publishing was well developed in the early decades of the 19th century, an American author customarily brought out his books at his own [financial] risk.”); SILVER, supra note
68, at 98 (“Often an author considered publication a sufficient reward and he risked
his own funds to achieve it.”). Thus, for instance, Thomas Paine self-published Common Sense (1776) and his first work, Case of the Officers of Excise (1772). See Bill Henderson, Independent Publishing: Today and Yesterday, 421 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 93, 95-96 (1975). Jeremy Belknap’s The History of New-Hampshire (1784), one of the
earliest works of serious history in America, was also self-published. See JEREMY
BELKNAP, THE HISTORY OF NEW-HAMPSHIRE, at tit. page (Philadelphia, Robert Aitken
1784) (indicating that the book was “printed for the author”); George B. Kirsch, Jeremy
Belknap: Man of Letters in the Young Republic, 54 NEW ENG. Q. 33, 35-36 (1981) (describing Belknap’s efforts to self-publish his history, and noting the significance of
Belknap’s work). Alexander Hamilton paid more than half of the cost of the first
printing of The Federalist in book form. See MAIER, supra note 31, at 84. And Tunis
Wortman’s early work on the freedom of the press was likewise self-published. See
TUNIS WORTMAN, A TREATISE, CONCERNING POLITICAL ENQUIRY, AND THE LIBERTY OF
THE PRESS, at tit. page (photo. reprint 1970) (1800). The notation “printed for the
author,” seen on Belknap’s and Wortman’s title pages, meant the book was published
at the author’s expense. Keith Maslen, Printing for the Author: From the Bowyer Printing
Ledgers, 1710–1775, [5 Ser. 27] THE LIBR. 302, 305 (1972).
70
See, e.g., CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY; RELATIVE TO
THE MANUMISSION OF NEGROES AND OTHERS HOLDEN IN BONDAGE, at tit. page (Burlington, Isaac Neale 1794) (“Printed for ‘The New-Jersey Society for Promoting the
Abolition of Slavery.’”).
71
See, e.g., HANNAH ADAMS & HANNAH FARNHAM SAWYER LEE, A MEMOIR OF MISS
HANNAH ADAMS 19-21 (Boston, Gray & Bowen 1832) (describing the 1791 publication
of the second edition of Adams’s dictionary of religions as funded partly by subscriptions and partly by the printer); JOEL BARLOW, THE VISION OF COLUMBUS 259-70
(Hartford, Hudson & Goodwin 1787) (listing the book’s many subscribers); 1 JOHN
TEBBEL, A HISTORY OF BOOK PUBLISHING IN THE UNITED STATES 113, 116, 133, 158-60
(1972) (discussing eighteenth century subscription publishing in America).
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of a desire to spread ideas. But in each of these categories, people outside the press-as-industry wrote many of these books.
Such authors were outside the “art or business of printing and
publishing,” to quote the 1828 Noah Webster definition of “press” that
72
most closely fits the press-as-industry model. They did not fit within
the “press” in the sense of “[n]ewspapers, journals, and periodical literature collectively,” to quote the comparable definition from the Ox73
ford English Dictionary. They likewise would not have fit within the
“press” as understood by the few modern decisions that adopt a press74
as-industry view of the First Amendment.
Such authors were akin to a modern businessman writing and dis75
76
tributing a book or funding a video program: they rented facilities
and services from printers, but they were not in the printing business
themselves. Yet books and pamphlets, which were predominantly
written by such authors, were routinely understood to be covered by
the “freedom of the press,” which suggests that this liberty was understood as encompassing more than just the press-as-industry.
To be sure, one could define such authors as part of “the press”
on the grounds that they used the press to communicate, even if they
didn’t own presses or make a living from presses. But that would be
the same as adopting the press-as-technology model. Book authors’
relationship to “the press” was in essence the same as the relationship
of the modern authors of occasional newspaper articles to the newspaper owners, or the relationship of modern advertisers to the news77
paper owners. All such authors used the press-as-technology by bor-

72

See 2 WEBSTER, supra note 24 (under “press”).
First Definition of “Press,” OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY ONLINE (Sept. 2011),
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/150765.
74
See, e.g., infra notes 318-19, 333, 380 and accompanying text; see also Matera v.
Superior Court, 825 P.2d 971, 973 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (interpreting a state statutory
privilege for members of the “media” as “intended to apply to persons who gather and
disseminate news on an ongoing basis as part of the organized, traditional, mass media”).
75
See infra note 380 (discussing the view of some FEC commissioners that book
authors aren’t entitled to the “media exemption” from campaign finance law).
76
See, e.g., Citizens United, Advisory Opinion 2004-30, at 2-3 (Fed. Election
Comm’n Sept. 10, 2004); see also infra notes 382-33. I analogize here to a hypothetical
individual speaker, not a corporation; to what extent the First Amendment protects
corporate speech, whether by newspapers or by the public, is a story for another day.
This Article focuses on the separate question of whether the “freedom . . . of the
press” protects newspapers, magazines, and the like—whether corporations or not—
more than it protects other organizations.
77
See, for example, People v. Judah, discussed infra subsection III.B.3.
73
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rowing or renting space on printing presses from members of the
press-as-industry.
B. Specific References to the Freedom of the Press
as Covering Books and Pamphlets
Around the Framing, books were clearly seen as covered by the
liberty of the press. David Hume’s The History of England, for instance,
said this to describe the 1694 expiration of the statute that required a
license to print:
The liberty of the press did not even commence with the revolution [of
1689]. It was not till 1694, that the restraints were taken off; to the great
displeasure of the king, and his ministers, who, seeing nowhere in any
government, during present or past ages, any example of such unlimited
freedom, doubted much of its salutary effects, and probably thought,
that no books or writings would ever so much improve the general understanding of men, as to render it safe to entrust them with an indul78
gence so easily abused.

Likewise, in his 1741 essay Liberty of the Press, Hume noted that “[w]e
need not dread from [the liberty of the press] any such ill Consequences as followed from the Harangues of the popular Demagogues
of Athens and Tribunes of Rome” because a “Man reads a Book or
Pamphlet alone and coolly” rather than surrounded by a mob that
79
may inflame him. Similarly, in 1788, James Iredell—then a defender
of the proposed Constitution and a soon-to-be Supreme Court Justice—spoke of the liberty of the press as including books:
The liberty of the press is always a grand topic for declamation, but
the future Congress will have no other authority over this than to secure
to authors for a limited time an exclusive privilege of publishing their
works.—This authority has been long exercised in England, where the
press is as free as among ourselves or in any country in the world; and
surely such an encouragement to genius is no restraint on the liberty of
the press, since men are allowed to publish what they please of their
own, and so far as this may be deemed a restraint upon others it is certainly a reasonable one . . . . If the Congress should exercise any other
power over the press than this, they will do it without any warrant from

78

8 DAVID HUME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 332 (London, T. Cadell 1782)
(1754–1762); see also Lewis, supra note 66, at 597-98 (“Those who called for ‘freedom of
the press’ in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had in mind books and pamphlets and all kinds of occasional literature as much as newspapers.”).
79
DAVID HUME, ESSAYS, MORAL AND POLITICAL 15 (Edinburgh, R. Fleming & A.
Allison 1761). As to pamphlets and other short publications, see infra notes 136-37
and accompanying text.
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Copyright law at the time covered books, maps, and charts, but not
81
newspapers. To talk about copyright law as even potentially related—however benignly—to the freedom of the press suggests that the
freedom of the press was seen as applicable to books.
Judge Alexander Addison’s 1799 grand jury charge similarly stated
that “the freedom of the press consists in this, that any man may,
without the consent of any other, print any book or writing whatever,
being . . . liable to punishment, if he injure an individual or the pub82
lic.” A law “that no book should be printed without permission from
a certain officer,” Addison said in the same charge, “would be a law
83
abridging the liberty of the press.” And St. George Tucker, in 1803,
echoed Hume in writing that the expiration of the licensing of printers in 1694 “established the freedom of the press in England,” partly
84
by freeing the printing and distribution of books.
C. Freedom of the Press as Extending to Literary,
Religious, and Scientific Works
Many leading sources of that era also spoke of the liberty of the
press as extending to literary, religious, and scientific writings, which
were often (probably much more often than not) published by people
who did not engage in journalism or printing for a living. Hume’s Of
the Liberty of the Press, for instance, discussed “the Liberty of the Press,
by which all the Learning, Wit, and Genius of the Nation may be employ’d on the side of [freedom] and everyone be animated to its De85
fence.” The Continental Congress’s 1774 Letter to the Inhabitants of
Quebec discussed the importance of the freedom of the press as con80

JAMES IREDELL, ANSWERS TO MR. MASON’S OBJECTIONS TO THE NEW CONSTITUTION RECOMMENDED BY THE LATE CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, reprinted in 2 LIFE
AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 186, 207-08 (Griffith J. McRee ed., New York,
D. Appleton & Co. 1858).
81
See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (1790) (repealed 1802); see
also Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1003 (Thompson, Circuit Justice, C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1829) (No. 2872) (“We are . . . of opinion that [a newspaper] is not a book, the copyright to which can be secured under the act of congress.”). Copyright law didn’t protect newspapers until 1909. See 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:60, at 3172 n.2 (2010).
82
ALEXANDER ADDISON, CHARGES TO GRAND JURIES OF THE COUNTIES OF THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT, IN THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 279 (Washington, John Colerick 1800).
83
Id. at 282.
84
1 TUCKER, supra note 22, app. 298.
85
HUME, supra note 79, at 14.
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sisting in part of “the advancement of truth, science, morality, and
86
arts,” as well as of politics. Nor was this an original view at the time;
the French philosopher Helvetius, who was well known to the Framing
87
generation, similarly wrote that “[i]t is to contradiction, and consequently to the liberty of the press, that physics owes its improvements.
Had this liberty never subsisted, how many errors, consecrated by
time, would be cited as incontestible axioms! What is here said of
88
physics is applicable to morality and politics.”
Justice Iredell expressed the same view in a 1799 grand jury
charge: “The liberty of the press . . . has converted barbarous nations
into civilized ones—taught science to rear its head—enlarged the capacity—increased the comforts of private life—and, leading the banners of freedom, has extended her sway where her very name was un89
Likewise, James Madison’s 1799 Address of the General
known.”
Assembly to the People of the Commonwealth of Virginia stated—in the middle of the discussion of the “liberty . . . of the press”—that “it is to the
press mankind are indebted for having dispelled the clouds which
long encompassed religion, for disclosing her genuine lustre, and dis90
seminating her salutary doctrines.”
Yet science, religion, morality, the arts, and civilization were mostly advanced by works written by people who were scientists, theologians, philosophers, or artists, not journalists or printers. It seems hard
to imagine that Hume, Iredell, Madison, and the Continental Congress were speaking about a freedom of the press that extended only
to newspapermen and excluded the Newtons, Luthers, Humes, Lockes, Jeffersons, and Madisons of the world.

86

Letter from the Continental Congress to the Inhabitants of the Providence
of Quebec (Oct. 26, 1774), in 1 JOURNALS OF CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789,
at 105, 108 (1904).
87
See, e.g., A COLUMBIAN PATRIOT [MERCY OTIS WARREN], OBSERVATIONS ON THE
NEW CONSTITUTION, AND ON THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONVENTIONS 2 (Boston, n.
pub. 1788) (quoting Helvetius); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Colonel William
Duane (Sept. 16, 1810) (same), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 538, 539
(H.A. Washington ed., Washington, Taylor & Maury 1853).
88
2 HELVETIUS, A TREATISE ON MAN, HIS INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES AND HIS EDUCATION 319 (W. Hooper ed. & trans., London, B. Law & G. Robinson 1777) (translating 2 HELVETIUS, DE L’HOMME, DE SES FACULTÉS INTELLECTUELLES, ET DE SON ÉDUCATION (London, La Société Typographique 1773)).
89
In re Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 838 (Iredell, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 5124).
90
James Madison, Address of the General Assembly to the People of the Commonwealth of Virginia ( J an. 23, 1799), in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 509, 511 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865).
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III. EVIDENCE FROM THE FRAMING AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC:
CASES FROM 1784 TO 1840
Fifteen early cases also show that courts and lawyers during the early
years of the Republic understood the freedom of the press as extending
to authors regardless of whether they were members of the press-asindustry. Though the American cases follow the drafting of the First
Amendment by one to five decades, they are entirely consistent with the
1700s evidence discussed above. I have seen no reason to think there
was some change from a press-as-industry understanding in the 1700s to
a press-as-technology understanding as shown in those cases.
If anything, the common definition of “press” was more clearly focused on the press-as-technology in the late 1700s than it was in the
1820s and 1830s. The only possibly relevant definition of “press” in
Samuel Johnson’s 1755–1756 dictionary referred just to the printing
91
92
press; the same was true of the 1790 edition and of Noah Webster’s
1806 A Compendious Dictionary of the English Language, published in
93
America. Noah Webster’s 1828 dictionary, on the other hand, included both the technology and the industry as possible meanings of
91

See 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, W.
Strahan 2d ed. 1756) (defining “press” as “[t]he instrument by which books are printed”). Johnson’s was “for well over a century . . . without peer as the most authoritative
dictionary in English.” SIDNEY I. LANDAU, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 56 (1984).
92
See 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J.F.
& C. Rivington et al. 9th ed. 1790) (defining “press” as “[t]he instrument by which
books are printed”).
93
See NOAH WEBSTER, A COMPENDIOUS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
235 (Hartford, Sidney’s Press 1806) (defining “press” as an “instrument used for printing”). The first American dictionary is short and has no entry for “press” or “liberty of
the press.” See SAMUEL JOHNSON, JR., A SCHOOL DICTIONARY 114, 142 (New Haven,
Edward O’Brien n.d.) (the author is not the more famous Samuel Johnson). Neither
do two of the leading English law dictionaries of the era. See 2 RICHARD BURN, A NEW
LAW DICTIONARY (London, A. Strahan & W. Woodfall 1792); 2 TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (London, J.F. & C. Rivington 3d ed.
1783). A third major law dictionary lists “press, (Liberty of the),” but simply cites back to
Blackstone, and adds the passage, “The printers of the public papers, should for ever
recollect the motto libertas sine licentia, or they, who doubtless wish well to that
principal bulwark of our constitution, may, tho’ without design, ultimately prove its
greatest enemies.” GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY 3 (London, W. Strahan & W.
Woodfall 10th ed. 1782). The instruction to “printers of the public papers” suggests
that their misbehavior was seen as a serious threat to the liberty of the press; but it does
not assert that the liberty belonged only to such printers, especially given Blackstone’s
discussion of this as a liberty of “every freeman.” The first American law dictionary
does not define “press,” but defines “liberty of the press” without shedding light on the
question before us. JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY 42 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W.
Johnson 1839).
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“press” (though the dictionary specifically defined the “liberty of the
press” as a right of “every citizen” and as including the right to publish
94
“books” and “pamphlets”). Likewise, the Oxford English Dictionary reports that the press-as-industry definition was just developing in the
late 1700s and early 1800s, giving this as definition 3(d) of “press”:
Newspapers, journals, and periodical literature collectively. . . . This use
of the word appears to have originated in phrases such as the liberty of the
press, to write for the press, to silence the press, etc., in which ‘press’ originally
had sense 3c [The printing-press in operation, the work or function of
the press; the art or practice of printing], but was gradually taken to
mean the products of the printing press. Quotations before 1820 reflect
95
the transition between these senses.

Yet despite that development, the 1820s and 1830s cases continued to
treat the “freedom of the press” as being everyone’s freedom to use
the technology. If judges used such a meaning in the 1820s and
1830s, it would have been even more certainly used in 1791, when the
alternative meaning of “press” to refer to the industry was just beginning to emerge.
A. Discussions of the Freedom of the Press as Protecting
Non-Press-as-Industry Writers (England)
Twelve of the fifteen cases I discuss involve “freedom of the press”
or “liberty of the press” being expressly discussed with regard to the
rights of people who were not members of the press-as-industry. These were not printers, newspaper publishers, or editors, but rather
people who wrote books, pamphlets, newspaper ads, or letters and
other submissions to the editor.
Sometimes the authors won and sometimes they lost: the freedom
of the press, even when it was implicated, was often not seen as providing particularly broad protection. But in all these cases, the lawyers
and the judges were willing to discuss the non-press-as-industry defendants’ rights under the freedom of the press. And there is no record of anyone arguing that the defendants lacked such rights because
they were not members of the press-as-industry.
94

WEBSTER, supra note 24 (under “press”). The main rival of Webster’s dictionary
contained shorter entries and included “an instrument for . . . printing” as the only
relevant definition of “press.” JOSEPH EMERSON WORCESTER, A COMPREHENSIVE PRONOUNCING AND EXPLANATORY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 243 (Boston,
Hillard et al. 1830); see also LANDAU, supra note 91, at 56 (listing Worcester as Webster’s chief American rival).
95
First Definition of “Press,” supra note 73.
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Of these twelve cases, three are English, but I include them because American judges and lawyers understood them as being relevant
to American constitutional law—both as evidence of the English “liberty of the press” as inherited by Americans at the Framing, and as influences on post-Framing American legal developments. Justice Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, to give just one
example, refers to only five cases in the “liberty of the press” section,
and two of them are English (the Dean of St. Asaph’s Case and Burdett,
96
both discussed below).
The American freedom of the press was often seen as broader
97
than the English common law definition, but I haven’t seen sources
suggesting that it was seen as narrower. And, as the discussion below
shows, the English cases are entirely consistent with the American cases on the question that we are discussing.
1. Rex v. Shipley (Dean of St. Asaph’s Case) (1784)
William Shipley, a minister who held the position of Dean of St.
Asaph Cathedral, was prosecuted in 1784 for seditious libel for re98
printing a pamphlet. (The pamphlet itself was also written by someone who was not a journalist or printer, William Jones, a lawyer and
99
judge.) Thomas Erskine defended Shipley, arguing that the liberty
of the press meant the jury had to determine whether the pamphlet
100
was indeed libelous —an argument that assumed the liberty covered
Shipley, who was not a member of the press-as-industry.
Lord Mansfield’s opinion in Shipley rejected Erskine’s argument,
and followed the then-orthodox English rule that the judge would de101
cide whether the publication was libelous.
But Mansfield did not
suggest that the liberty of the press was limited to members of the
press-as-industry, which would have categorically excluded Shipley.
96

3 STORY, supra note 24, §§ 1879–1883, at 737 & nn.1 & 3, 742 n.1.
See, e.g., MADISON, supra note 47, at 569-70 (“Th[e constitutional] security of the
freedom of the press requires that it should be exempt, not only from previous restraint of the executive, as in Great Britain, but from legislative restraint also . . . .”).
98
R v. Shipley (The Dean of St. Asaph’s Case), (1784) 21 How. St. Tr. 847 (K.B.)
847-58.
99
Id. at 876-77.
100
Id. at 900, 903, 924, 1005, 1023. This was the same argument made by Andrew
Hamilton on behalf of John Peter Zenger in 1735 in New York. R v. Zenger (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1735) (statement of defense counsel Andrew Hamilton), reprinted in JOHN PETER
ZENGER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRYAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER, PRINTER
OF THE NEW-YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 29-30 (Boston, Thomas Fleet 1738).
101
21 How. St. Tr. at 1035, 1040.
97
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Rather, Mansfield wrote (echoing Blackstone) that “[t]he liberty of
the press consists in printing without any previous licence, subject to
102
Under this view, all publications—
the consequences of law.”
including those by non-press-as-industry authors such as Shipley—
were protected only from prior restraints, and all could be punished
by the law of seditious libel.
And Erskine’s defense was known and approved of in America.
Both the case and Erskine’s arguments were cited extensively in People
v. Croswell, the leading 1804 New York case that dealt with whether
103
truth was a defense in libel cases. Erskine’s position was quoted by
104
the defense in the 1806 case United States v. Smith; though the reference was to the role of the jury generally, and not to free speech in
particular, the detailed quotation of Erskine’s speech to the jury suggests that the speech was known and respected in early America.
Later, Justice Story mentioned the “celebrated defense of Mr. Erskine,
on the trial of the Dean of St. Asaph” in the freedom of the press sec105
tion of his 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution.
The quotations gave no hint that Erskine’s use of the liberty of the
press to defend a churchman rather than a newspaperman was at all
questionable. Rather, they seem consistent with the American understanding of the right’s being a right of “every citizen.”
2. Rex v. Rowan (1794)
Archibald Hamilton Rowan was an Irish radical politician and one
of the leaders of the Society of United Irishmen. The Society published a 1500-word broadside, titled “An Address to the Volunteers of

102

Id. at 1040.
See 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 341, 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) (2-2 decision) (noting that
the trial court cited Shipley to the jury and the prosecution relied on it in defending the
judgment on appeal); id. at 371-72 (opinion of Kent, J.) (discussing Shipley); id. at 405,
408 (opinion of Lewis, C.J.) (citing Erskine’s arguments). A 1797 U.S. Attorney General opinion likewise quoted Shipley, though focusing only on Lord Mansfield’s
opinion. Libellous Publ’ns, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 71, 72 (1797).
104
United States v. Smith (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806), reprinted in THOMAS LLOYD, THE TRIALS OF WILLIAM S. SMITH, AND SAMUEL G. OGDEN, FOR MISDEMEANOURS 177 (New
York, I. Riley & Co. 1807).
105
3 STORY, supra note 24, § 1879, at 737 n.3; see also BENJAMIN L. OLIVER, THE
RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN 325 (Boston, Marsh, Capen & Lyon 1832) (noting
that Erskine’s “argument on the trial of the Dean of St. Asaph . . . is now the settled law
of the land” in both the United States and England).
103
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Ireland”; Rowan distributed it, which led to his being prosecuted for
106
seditious libel.
107
Rowan was a politician, not an editor or a printer. Nonetheless,
both the prosecutors and the defense counsel, John Philpot Curran,
told the jury that the case touched on the “freedom of the press” or
108
the “liberty of the press”; their disagreement was about whether Ro109
wan’s actions were an abuse of the freedom, and thus punishable.
As in Shipley, the liberty of the press was apparently seen as applying to
all, not just to members of the press-as-industry.
Rowan’s case was well publicized in America. A full-length report
110
of the trial was reprinted in New York, and advertised both there
111
112
and in Baltimore.
The trial was discussed in newspapers, as was
113
Rowan’s imprisonment and escape. Shortly after his escape, Rowan
114
fled to America, where he received some attention from fellow

106

R v. Rowan, (1794) 22 How. St. Tr. 1033 (K.B.) 1034-37.
See, e.g., ARCHIBALD HAMILTON ROWAN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 147 (Dublin, Thomas
Tegg & Co. 1840) (discussing Rowan’s entry into Irish politics).
108
See Rowan, 22 How. St. Tr. at 1069, 1087-88 (statement of defense counsel); id.
at 1105-06 (statement of prosecutor); id. at 1157 (statement of Solicitor General).
109
Id. at 1069-70 (statement of defense counsel).
110
See REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF ARCHIBALD HAMILTON ROWAN, ESQ. (New York,
Thiebout & O’Brien 1794) (1794). The Dublin printing is labeled “printed for Archibald Hamilton Rowan,” which reflects the fact that Rowan was not the printer, but just
a politician who paid a printer to have the report printed. REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF
ARCHIBALD HAMILTON ROWAN, ESQ., at tit. page (Dublin, Archibald Hamilton Rowan
1794); see also supra note 69 (discussing the meaning of notations that a book was published for the author).
111
See Advertisement, N.Y. DAILY GAZETTE, May 31, 1794, at 3; Advertisement,
DIARY (New York), June 18, 1794, at 3 (same); Advertisement, BALT. DAILY INTELLIGENCER, June 30, 1794, at 3.
112
See Miscellany: Sketch of the Trial of Arch. Hamilton Rowan, Esq., THE MERCURY
(Boston), May 30, 1794, at 1 (describing the trial); Sketch of the Trial of Arch. Hamilton
Rowan, Esq., N.Y. DAILY GAZETTE, May 19, 1794, supp. 1 (reporting, among other
things, the defense lawyer’s speech that discussed the freedom of the press); see also
John B. Duckett, An Oration on the Liberty of the Press, FED. INTELLIGENCER & BALT. DAILY
GAZETTE, Dec. 6, 1794, at 2 (mentioning Rowan’s case as an example of the “insatiable
cruelty” of judges who fail to properly protect the liberty of the press).
113
See War Expences of Prussia, DUNLAP & CLAYPOOLE’S AM. DAILY ADVERTISER
(Philadelphia), June 2, 1794, at 3 (condemning the alleged conditions of Rowan’s confinement); see also A Proclamation, AM. MINERVA (New York), July 2, 1794, at 2 (reporting on the reward offered by British authorities for information leading to Rowan’s
recapture); Particulars of the Escape of Archibald Hamilton Rowan, GAZETTE U.S. (Philadelphia), July 5, 1794, at 2 (reporting on Rowan’s escape).
114
See ROWAN, supra note 107, at 280 (describing Rowan’s arrival in Philadelphia).
107
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115

116

democrats and became an acquaintance of Thomas Jefferson.
The case was remembered in later years as well: Curran’s speech in
Rowan’s defense, which included discussion of the liberty of the press,
was reprinted in America in separate collections, in 1805, 1807, and
117
1811, and the Rowan trial was mentioned by prosecutor William
118
Wirt in Aaron Burr’s 1808 trial for treason.
3. Rex v. Burdett (1820)
119

120

Rex v. Burdett stemmed from a letter to the editor written by
Sir Francis Burdett, a nobleman and reformist politician rather than a
printer or journalist. Though Burdett was not a member of the pressas-industry, the presiding judge referred to the “liberty of the press”
121
122
four times in his opinion, and twice in his instructions to the jury.
The judge’s opinion also stressed that “the liberty of the press” means
123
that “every man ought to be permitted to instruct his fellow subjects.”
124
The prosecutor mentioned the “liberty of the press” as well.
Burdett was well-known in America. It was cited as to “liberty of the
125
press” in Chancellor Kent’s 1827 Commentaries on American Law and

115

See PETER PORCUPINE [WILLIAM COBBETT], THE DEMOCRATIC JUDGE: OR THE
EQUAL LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 78 (Philadelphia, William Cobbett 1798) (detailing Rowan’s warm welcome with “many cheers”).
116
See 2 GEORGE TUCKER, THE LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 39 (London, Charles
Knight & Co. 1837) (summarizing the communication between Rowan and Jefferson);
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to A.H. Rowan (Sept. 26, 1798) (offering support to
Rowan and outlining rights available in the United States), in 3 MEMOIRS, CORRESPONDENCE, AND PRIVATE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 34, at 408-09.
117
See FORENSIC ELOQUENCE: SKETCHES OF TRIALS IN IRELAND FOR HIGH TREASON, ETC. 1 (Baltimore, G. Douglas 2d ed. 1805); 3 NATHANIEL CHAPMAN, SELECT
SPEECHES, FORENSICK AND PARLIAMENTARY 153-93 (Philadelphia, B.B. Hopkins, & Co.
1807); 1 SPEECHES OF JOHN PHILPOT CURRAN, ESQ. 64-104 (New York, I. Riley 1811).
118
1 DAVID ROBERTSON, REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF COLONEL AARON BURR 402
(Philadelphia, Hopkins & Earle 1808).
119
R v. Burdett, (1820) 106 Eng. Rep. 873 (K.B.); 4 B. & Ald. 95.
120
See FAIRBURN’S EDITION OF THE TRIAL OF SIR F. BURDETT, ON A CHARGE OF A
SEDITIOUS LIBEL AGAINST HIS MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT 2-3, 10-11 (London, John
Fairburn 1820).
121
Burdett, 106 Eng. Rep. at 887-88; 4 B. & Ald. at 132. As in some of the other
cases discussed in this Section, the judge concluded that the liberty of the press was
limited and extended only to statements made “with temper and moderation” rather
than “vituperation.” Id. at 888; 4 B. & Ald. at 133.
122
FAIRBURN’S EDITION OF THE TRIAL OF SIR F. BURDETT, supra note 120, at 37-38.
123
Burdett, 106 Eng. Rep. at 887; 4 B. & Ald. at 132 (emphasis added).
124
FAIRBURN’S EDITION OF THE TRIAL OF SIR F. BURDETT, supra note 120, at 9.
125
2 KENT, supra note 28, at 15.

VOLOKH_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

12/21/2011 5:47 PM

Freedom for the Press as an Industry or Technology?

489

126

in Joseph Story’s 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution, as to venue in
127
libel cases in Commonwealth v. Blanding (1825), and in a general note
128
on libel law following People v. Simons (1823).
B. Discussions of the Freedom of the Press as Protecting
Non-Press-as-Industry Writers (America)
1. United States v. Cooper (1800)
One of the leading cases under the Sedition Act of 1798 involved
the prosecution of Thomas Cooper for publishing a one-page hand129
bill criticizing President Adams. At the time of the trial, Cooper was
not a member of the institutional press. He had edited the Northumberland Gazette for two months, but that task had ended four months
130
before the leaflet was distributed. Moreover, the leaflet that led to
131
his prosecution was unrelated to his past editorial tasks.
Yet the trial was seen as implicating the freedom of the press. In
response to the argument that his leaflet diminished the confidence
of the people in the government, Cooper argued to the jury that this
confidence should be earned, and not “exacted by the guarded provisions of Sedition Laws, by attacks on the Freedom of the Press, by
prosecutions, pains, and penalties on those which boldly express the
132
truth.”
He went on to say that “in the present state of affairs, the
press is open to those who will praise, while the threats of the Law
133
hang over those who blame the conduct of the men in power.” Lat126

3 STORY, supra note 24, §§ 1878–1879, at 737 nn.1 & 3.
20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 311 (1825); see also Commonwealth v. Child, 30 Mass.
(13 Pick.) 198, 200 (1832) (noting that the Attorney General cited Burdett).
128
1 Wheel. Cr. Cas. 339, 359 (N.Y. Ct. Spec. Sess. 1823).
129
See Eugene Volokh, Thomas Cooper, Early American Public Intellectual, 4 N.Y.U. J.L.
& LIBERTY 372, 376-77 (2009) (describing Cooper’s libel prosecution).
130
DUMAS MALONE, THE PUBLIC LIFE OF THOMAS COOPER 1783–1839, at 91, 105
(1926); see also THOMAS COOPER, POLITICAL ESSAYS, at preface, 4, 31-32 (Northumberland, Andrew Kennedy 1799) (corroborating the dates in Malone’s report).
131
For a modern perspective on this, see, for example, FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1986), which held that even an organization
that publishes a regular newsletter isn’t entitled to the election law “press exemption”
for a different publication that the organization distributes through other channels.
See also Henry v. Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775, 781 (Mo. 1985) (holding that even a
newsletter publisher should be treated as a nonmedia defendant when he sends an article to specific people, rather than just publishing it in his regular newsletter).
132
United States v. Cooper (Chase, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1800), reprinted in
THOMAS COOPER, AN ACCOUNT OF THE TRIAL OF THOMAS COOPER OF NORTHUMBERLAND 19 (Philadelphia, John Bioren 1800).
133
Id.
127
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er, complaining about the court’s requiring him to produce certain
original documents to support his defense, he argued that such requirements “would be an engine of oppression of itself sufficiently
134
powerful to establish a perfect despotism over the press.”
And Justice Samuel Chase’s charge to the jury seems to support the
notion that the prosecution involved “the press,” which in context must
have meant use of the press-as-technology and not the press-as-industry.
Seditious libel prosecutions, Chase argued, were proper because
[a] republican government can only be destroyed in two ways; the introduction of luxury, or the licentiousness of the press. This latter is the
more slow but most sure and certain means of bringing about the destruction of the government. The legislature of this country knowing
this maxim, has thought proper to pass a law to check this licentiousness
of the press—by a clause in that law it is enacted (reads the second sec135
tion of the sedition law).

Others also characterized Cooper’s prosecution as involving “the
freedom of the press.” John Thomson echoed Cooper’s assertions
that his prosecution violated the freedom of the press in An Enquiry,
Concerning the Liberty, and Licentiousness of the Press:
What was James Thomson Callender pros[e]cuted for at Richmond? For
publishing his opinions through the medium of the Press. What was
Charles Holt, the Editor of the New London Bee, prosecuted for? Because he published the opinions of another person. What was Thomas
Cooper prosecuted for? For publishing his opinions through the same
mode of communication:—viz. the Press. . . . [T]he Constitution has
been violated, both by the Sedition law under which they were convicted,
136
and by the prosecutions themselves.

And the following year, John Wood’s History of the Administration of
John Adams likewise stated,
The prosecutions of Lyon and Callender, of Cooper and Holt, are the
best commentary upon the Sedition law. The names of these gentlemen
will be quoted in support of the liberty of the press, and of the tyranny of

134

Id. at 35. This difficulty was peculiar to this trial, rather than to all Sedition Act
prosecutions; Cooper thus wasn’t complaining about what the Sedition Act did in other prosecutions (which indeed mostly targeted press-as-industry speakers), but rather
was asserting his own rights as a user of “the press.”
135
Id. at 42-43.
136
JOHN THOMSON, AN ENQUIRY, CONCERNING THE LIBERTY, AND LICENTIOUSNESS
OF THE PRESS, AND THE UNCONTROULABLE NATURE OF THE HUMAN MIND 25 (New
York, Johnson & Stryker 1801).
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Mr. Adams, when the labored arguments of Paterson and Peters, of Ire137
dell, Addison and Chase, are no longer remembered.

Thompson and Wood discussed Cooper, who had a leaflet printed
for him, the same way they discussed Lyon, Callender, and Holt, who
published their libels in the newspapers they edited.
2. Impeachment of Justice Chase (1805)
Five years later, Justice Chase found himself as a defendant in an
impeachment proceeding. The House prosecution argued that Justice Chase had misbehaved in criticizing the administration from the
138
bench.
In the course of the trial, one of the managers of the prosecution,
Congressman John Randolph—the leader of the House Democratic139
Republicans —noted that his only objection was to “the prostitution
of the bench of justice to the purposes of an hustings” and “de140
Randolph
claim[ing] on [political topics] from his seat of office.”
stressed that he was not objecting to any extrajudicial publications
that Chase might produce: “Let him speak and write and publish as
he pleases. This is his right in common with his fellow citizens. The
press is free.” Thus, Chase—not a member of the press-as-industry—
was seen as being free to, “in common with his fellow citizens,” “pub141
lish as he pleases” using the “free” “press.”
Unlike in the other cases in this subsection, the only statement
about the “press” in this case came from an advocate, not from a
judge. But Randolph had little to gain by using a controversial definition of “free” “press,” or by trying to broaden the liberty of the press
beyond its established boundaries. Indeed, he had something to lose,
since using a controversial definition would have made his argument
less persuasive. His willingness as an advocate to refer to Chase as having the right to use the “free” “press” suggests that he knew his audience would accept the argument.

137
JOHN WOOD, THE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN ADAMS, ESQ. 221
(New York, n. pub. 1802).
138
See 1 TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE 123 (Washington, Samuel H. Smith 1805).
139
See HENRY ADAMS, JOHN RANDOLPH 55 (Boston & New York, Houghton, Mifflin
& Co. 1898) (describing the close working relationship between President Jefferson
and John Randolph).
140
1 TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE, supra note 138, at 123.
141
Id.
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3. People v. Judah (1823)
142

In People v. Judah, Samuel Judah, the apparently nineteen-year143
old author of a self-published, book-length poem called Gotham and
the Gothamites, was prosecuted for libeling various noted New Yorkers
144
Though the defendant had written and published
in the poem.
145
some plays, the category “playwright” would likely not have been
considered part of the press-as-industry. Playwrights of the era chiefly
146
wrote as a sideline to their normal occupations and published as a
147
sideline to trying to get their plays staged.
Nor is it likely that Gotham and the Gothamites itself, a self-published poem mocking local notables, would have been a viable commercial venture for the author.
Moreover, even if Judah had been seen as a professional book author,
it’s not clear that this would have made him a member of the press-as148
industry.
Yet the court thought it necessary to instruct the jury about the
liberty of the press, though stressing that such liberty was limited to
examining the character of candidates for public office and did not

142

2 Wheel. Cr. Cas. 26 (N.Y. Gen. Sess. Ct. 1823).
See SAMUEL B.H. JUDAH, GOTHAM AND THE GOTHAMITES, at tit. page (New York,
S. King 1823) (indicating that the book was “published for the author”); supra note 69
(discussing the meaning of “published for the author”).
144
I say “apparently” because defense counsel asserted that Judah was nineteen, 2
Wheel. Cr. Cas. at 32, and the court said that Judah was “under age,” id. at 41, which
suggests that the court was accepting defense counsel’s assertion. There is some uncertainty, though, about whether Judah was nineteen or twenty-four. See 1 JACOB RADER MARCUS, UNITED STATES JEWRY: 1776–1985, at 460 (1989).
145
See, e.g., SAMUEL B.H. JUDAH, THE MOUNTAIN TORRENT (New York, Thomas
Longworth 1820); SAMUEL B.H. JUDAH, ODOFRIEDE (New York, Wiley & Halsted 1822);
SAMUEL B.H. JUDAH, THE ROSE OF ARRAGON (New York, S. King 2d ed. 1822); SAMUEL
B.H. JUDAH, A TALE OF LEXINGTON (New York, Dramatic Repository 1823).
146
See Gary A. Richardson, Plays and Playwrights: 1800–1865 (“[P]laywriting as a
profession arguably did not exist in early nineteenth-century America.”), in 1 THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN THEATRE 250, 251-52 (Don B. Wilmeth & Christopher Bigsby eds., 1998).
147
See ARTHUR HOBSON QUINN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN DRAMA: FROM THE
BEGINNING TO THE CIVIL WAR 161 (2d ed. 1943) (reporting that playwrights made little
money from their plays, and what money they made generally came not from publishing but from the proceeds of special third-night performances designated for their
benefit); Richardson, supra note 146, at 254 (concluding that printing one’s play
wasn’t likely to make money, because then-existing copyright law wouldn’t block rival
productions of a play and theater managers could therefore stage a published play
without compensating the playwright).
148
The few modern cases that take a press-as-industry view of the freedom of the
press, and that consider whether book authors qualify as members of the press-asindustry, conclude that they do not so qualify. See cases cited supra note 74.
143
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149

include “invad[ing] the sanctity of private repose.”
Likewise, when
pronouncing sentence, the court again mentioned the liberty of the
press, but reasoned that the punishment imposed on Judah did not
150
violate the liberty because his libels were an abuse of the liberty.
4. People v. Simons, Commonwealth v. Blanding, In re Austin,
Commonwealth v. Thomson, and Taylor v. Delavan
These five cases all involved materials submitted to newspapers—as
a paid ad, as a letter to the editor, or as a similar submission—by people
who were not publishers, editors, or employees of the newspaper.
a. People v. Simons (1823)
People v. Simons involved a newspaper advertisement bought by defendants, businessmen who accused two other businessmen of being
151
Defendants were prosecuted for criminal libel, and apinsolvent.
pealed to the liberty of the press secured by the New York Constitu152
tion’s Bill of Rights. The prosecution acknowledged the applicability of the constitutional provision, but argued that the provision was
limited to “publication . . . made with good motives, and for justifiable
153
ends.” The court instructed the jury about the constitutional provi154
155
sion, echoing the prosecution’s point. The jury acquitted.
The reporter’s note following Simons was consistent with the
court’s implicit assumption that businessmen buying an advertisement
were protected by the “liberty of the press.” “In this country,” the
note said, “every man may publish temperate investigations of the na156
ture and forms of government.” “It has always been a favourite privilege of the American citizen” (a “right . . . guaranteed to us by the constitution”) “to investigate the tendency of public measures, and the
157
character and conduct of public men.”

149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

2 Wheel. Cr. Cas. at 34.
Id. at 36.
People v. Simons, 1 Wheel. Cr. Cas. 339, 340 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1823).
Id. at 349.
Id. at 350.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 355 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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b. Commonwealth v. Blanding (1825)
In Commonwealth v. Blanding, James Blanding—a farmer and the
158
city clerk —was convicted of libeling someone by submitting an item
159
for publication in a newspaper.
The appellate court rejected
Blanding’s freedom of the press argument, but only because it concluded that libels weren’t covered by the freedom of the press, and
because the freedom of the press was only a freedom from prior restraint: “The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who
used it was to be responsible in case of its abuse; like the right to keep
fire arms, which does not protect him who uses them for annoyance
160
or destruction.”
c. In re Austin (1835)
The court in In re Austin reversed the disbarment of several lawyers who had submitted to a newspaper an open letter urging a judge
161
to resign. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that a lawyer
may be disciplined for “scrutiny into the official conduct of the judg162
es” only when such scrutiny was libelous, which at the time was seen
163
as turning on the author’s motive. And “when thus limited” to libel,
the court concluded, the possibility of “professional responsibility for
164
libel” does not “impinge on the liberty of the press,” precisely because everyone, lawyer or not, could be legally punished for libel. The
non-press-as-industry lawyer authors in this case were thus seen as potentially protected by “the liberty of the press” on precisely the same
terms as others were.

158

See 3 REPRESENTATIVE MEN AND OLD FAMILIES OF SOUTHEASTERN MASSACHU1314-15 (1912).
159
See 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 304 (1825).
160
Id. at 314.
161
In re Austin, 5 Rawle 191, 208 (Pa. 1835).
162
Id. at 205.
163
Compare id. (“It is the motive therefore that makes an invasion of the judge’s
rights a breach of professional fidelity . . . .”), with Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates 267,
270 (Pa. 1805) (holding, in a newspaper case, that “[t]he liberty of the press consists in
publishing the truth, from good motives and for justifiable ends” (quoting New York v.
Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 352 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) (statement of defense counsel Alexander Hamilton))).
164
In re Austin, 5 Rawle at 205.
SETTS
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d. Commonwealth v. Thomson (1839)
In Commonwealth v. Thomson, Thomson—an herbalist who claimed
to have invented a new system for treating diseases—placed an advertisement in a newspaper denouncing as an impostor another doctor
165
who was claiming to practice the same system. Thomson was prosecuted for libel, and his lawyers argued that he was protected by the
166
liberty of the press. The judge’s instructions to the jury mentioned
the liberty of the press, but stated that libel law did not violate that
167
168
liberty. The jury convicted.
e. Taylor v. Delavan (1840)
The defendant in Taylor v. Delavan was a temperance activist who
169
submitted an item for publication in a newspaper, alleging that a local brewer was using dirty water to brew his beer. The brewer sued for
libel. The judge’s instructions to the jury noted that the law “affords
to every citizen the free use of the press to publish for the information
or protection of the public,” but also “restrains this liberty by requir170
171
ing an adherence to truth.” The jury acquitted.
5. Brandreth v. Lance (1839)
172

Brandreth v. Lance was the first American court decision to strike
down an injunction as an unconstitutional interference with the freedom of the press. Lance was a business rival of Brandreth, who commissioned a man named Trust to write an allegedly libelous biography
of Brandreth and then contracted with a printer named Hodges to
publish it. Brandreth asked for, and got, an injunction barring busi165

See Commonwealth v. Thomson (Boston Mun. Ct. 1839), reprinted in REPORT OF
3-5 (Boston, Henry P. Lewis 1839). In the 1830s,
two publications, the Thomsonian Recorder and the Thomsonian Manual, publicized
Thomson’s theories and were at various times endorsed by Thomson; but neither was
edited or published by Thomson. See JOHN S. HALLER JR., THE PEOPLE’S DOCTORS:
SAMUEL THOMSON AND THE AMERICAN BOTANICAL MOVEMENT, 1790–1860, at 107-10,
215 (2000). In any event, neither publication is mentioned in the case.
166
Thomson, supra note 165, at 40-41.
167
Id. at 46.
168
Id. at 48.
169
Taylor v. Delavan (N.Y. Cir. Ct. 1840), reprinted in A REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF
THE CAUSE OF JOHN TAYLOR VS. EDWARD C. DELAVAN, PROSECUTED FOR AN ALLEGED
LIBEL 6-7 (Albany, Hoffman, White & Visscher 1840).
170
Id. at 45.
171
Id. at 48.
172
8 Paige Ch. 24, 26 (N.Y. Ch. 1839).
THE TRIAL OF DR. SAMUEL THOMSON

VOLOKH_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

12/21/2011 5:47 PM

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

496

[Vol. 160: 459

nessman Lance, writer Trust, and printer Hodges from publishing the
173
biography.
The New York Chancery Court reversed, holding that
174
Nothing in the
the injunction violated the liberty of the press.
court’s opinion suggested that the liberty of the press was a right that
belonged only to printer Hodges; the injunction was dissolved as to all
175
defendants, including Trust and Lance.
6. Summary
All these cases suggest that the “freedom of the press” was seen as
applicable not just to newspapermen, but also to ministers, politicians,
businessmen, physicians, and others. One or another of the cases
might be seen as an anomaly (for instance, because a particular defendant might have been viewed by the court as being closely enough
linked to the press). But put together, these cases suggest that the
press-as-technology model was widely accepted, and that there was
nothing controversial about discussing the freedom of the press as belonging to people who weren’t members of the press-as-industry.
C. Cases Involving Newspaper Defendants
Three more cases involved newspaper editors as defendants, but
in a context that shed light on the broader definition of the freedom
of the press.
1. Commonwealth v. Buckingham (1822)
Commonwealth v. Buckingham concluded that the liberty of the
press secured to a defendant the right to introduce the truth of the
statement as evidence that he published with a good motive, and
176
therefore the accused wouldn’t be guilty of libel. In the process, the
judge discussed what “the press” meant:
What is the press?
It is an instrument; an instrument of great moral and intellectual efficacy.
The liberty of the press, therefore, is nothing more than the liberty of
173

Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 27.
175
Id. at 28.
176
Commonwealth v. Buckingham (Boston Mun. Ct. 1822), reprinted in TRIAL:
COMMONWEALTH VS. J.T. BUCKINGHAM, ON AN INDICTMENT FOR LIBEL 13 (Boston, J.T.
Buckingham 4th ed. 1830).
174
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a moral and intellectual being, (that is, of a moral agent) to use that particular instrument.
....
If A. thrust B. through with a sword, and he dies, A. has used an instrument over which he had power; whether in that he was guilty of an
act of licentiousness, for which he is obnoxious to punishment, or merely exercised an authorized liberty, for which he shall go free, depends
not upon the fact, or the effect, but upon the motive and end, which induced the thrust.
....
. . . [I]f the liberty to use the press depended, like the liberty to use
every other instrument, upon the quality of the motive and the end . . .
then the right to give the truth in evidence would follow necessarily and
of course.
....
Is there any thing in the nature of the instrument, called the press,
which makes the liberty of a moral agent to use it, different from his liberty to use any other instrument?
....
In other words, is it possible, that in a free country, under a Constitution which declares the liberty of the press is essential to the security of
freedom, and that it ought not to be restrained; is it possible, that it is
not the right of every citizen to use the press for a good motive and justifiable end?
....
In the opinion of this court, this right is inherent in every citizen, under our Constitution, and a court of justice ha[s] no more right to deny to
a person charged with a malicious use of the press, the liberty to show that
its use was, in the particular case, for a good motive and a justifiable end,
than it has a right to deny to a man indicted for murder, the liberty to
177
show that he gave the blow for a purpose which the law justifies.

The liberty of the press, according to the court, was a right belonging to “each citizen” to use the press as an “instrument”—an in178
strument in the same sense that a “sword” is an instrument.
This
177

Id. at 11-13.
One might view the “press” in the sense of the collective industry of newspaper
publishing as an “instrument” in the hands of a politician, but one would not view it as
an instrument in the hands of a particular newspaper publisher. The “press” as a publisher’s instrument is likely the printing press. See, e.g., Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501, 515
(1855) (noting that under the Indiana Constitution’s free press clause, libel could lead
to “loss, by forfeiture, of the particular press made the instrument of abuse” of the
178
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reasoning suggests that the press was indeed seen as a technology that
“every citizen” had a right to use, and not as an industry whose members alone had a right to publish.
2. Dexter v. Spear (1825) and Root v. King (1827)
Finally, two cases expressly stressed that printers and editors had
precisely the same rights under the freedom of the press as other writers did. Thus, in Dexter v. Spear, Justice Story (riding circuit) wrote
that “[t]he liberty of speech and the liberty of the press do not authorize malicious and injurious defamation. There can be no right in
179
printers, any more than in other persons, to do wrong.”
Similarly,
Root v. King stated that, under the state constitution’s “liberty of the
press,” newspaper editors have no “other rights than such as are
180
common to all.”
As the cases suggest, lawyers for newspapers had by the 1820s indeed begun to make arguments for special protection for the press-as181
industry. But these arguments were consistently rejected.
IV. THE UNDERSTANDING AROUND THE RATIFICATION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
By the years surrounding the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the freedom of the press-as-technology understanding
was even more clearly established. To begin with, a long line of cases
expressly held—as did Dexter v. Spear and Root v. King in the 1820s—
that the institutional press had no greater rights than anyone else.
Thus, Aldrich v. Press Printing Co. (1864) held, “The press does not posright to speak, write or print, freely, on any subject whatsoever), overruled in part on other
grounds by Schmitt v. F.W. Cook Brewing Co., 120 N.E. 19, 21 (Ind. 1918); HOLT, supra
note 10, at 49-50 (characterizing the “press,” in the discussion of “liberty of the press,”
as a “newly discovered instrument,” and stating that “[w]hen we have termed the press
a new and enlarged instrument of publication, whether of good or evil, we have, in
fact, pointed out that part of its nature which defines and circumscribes the law which
attaches to it”); THOMAS STARKIE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLANDER, LIBEL, SCANDALUM MAGNATUM, AND FALSE RUMOURS 163 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1813) (“The
pencil of the caricaturist is frequently an instrument of ridicule more powerful than
the press . . . .”); THOMAS STARKIE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLANDER, LIBEL, SCANDALUM MAGNATUM, AND FALSE RUMOURS 142 (Edward D. Ingraham ed., New York,
George Lamson 1st Am. ed. 1826) (same).
179
7 F. Cas. 624, 624-25 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.R.I. 1825) (No. 3867).
180
7 Cow. 613, 628 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827).
181
See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Oliphant, 2 Hill 510, 513 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (acknowledging such an argument about the common law rule, though not about the constitutional protection).
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182

sess any immunities, not shared by every individual.” Sheckell v. Jackson (1852) likewise upheld a jury instruction that stated,
[I]t has been urged upon you that conductors of the public press are entitled to peculiar indulgence, and have especial rights and privileges.
The law recognizes no such peculiar rights, privileges, or claims to indulgence. They have no rights but such as are common to all. They have
183
just the same rights that the rest of the community have, and no more.
184

185

Smart v. Blanchard (1860), Palmer v. City of Concord (1868), Atkins v.
186
187
Johnson (1870), People v. Storey (1875), Johnson v. St. Louis Dispatch
188
189
190
Co. (1877), Sweeney v. Baker (1878), Barnes v. Campbell (1879),
191
and Delaware State Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Croasdale (1880) all echoed this position.

182

9 Minn. 123, 129 (1864).
64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 25, 26-27 (1852); see also Stone v. Cooper, 2 Denio 293, 304
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) (“[Libel law] is quite consistent with that freedom of speech and
of the press which all regard as sacred and inviolable. Public journalists have no peculiar exemption from the general rules of law on this subject, and are liable for injurious publications in precisely the same cases in which individuals in other professions
or employments would be.”).
184
See 42 N.H. 137, 151 (1860) (“The conductor of a public press has the same
rights to publish information that others have, and no more. He has no peculiar rights
or special privileges or claims to indulgence.”).
185
See 48 N.H. 211, 216 (1868) (“Conductors of the public press have no rights but
such as are common to all.” (citing Sheckell, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) at 26-27)).
186
See 43 Vt. 78, 82 (1870) (“The publisher of a newspaper has no more right [under the ‘freedom of the press’] to publish a libel upon an individual, tha[n] he or any
other man has to make a slanderous proclamation by word of mouth.”).
187
See People v. Storey (Cook Cnty. Crim. Ct. 1875) (“Editors must understand that
their rights are the same, and no greater, than other citizens, and their responsibilities no
less.”), as reprinted in 1 JAMES APPLETON MORGAN, THE LAW OF LITERATURE 271, 275-76
(New York, James Cockcroft & Co. 1875), rev’d on other grounds, 79 Ill. 45 (1875).
188
See 65 Mo. 539, 541-42 (1877) (stating that the “press should not, and under
our constitution cannot, be muzzled,” but going on to say that a “‘newspaper proprietor . . . is liable for what he publishes in the same manner as any other individual’”
(quoting JOHN TOWNSHEND, A TREATISE ON THE WRONGS CALLED SLANDER AND LIBEL
§ 252, at 343 (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1868))).
189
See 13 W. Va. 158, 182 (1878) (quoting Sheckell, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) at 26-27,
though citing it by the wrong name), overruled on other grounds by Bailey v. Charleston
Mail Ass’n, 27 S.E.2d 837 (W. Va. 1943), but reaffirmed on this point by Swearingen v.
Parkersburg Sentinel Co., 26 S.E.2d 209 (W. Va. 1943).
190
See 59 N.H. 128, 128-29 (1879) (“[P]rofessional publishers of news . . . have the
same right to give information that others have, and no more.” (citing Sheckell, 64 Mass.
(10 Cush.) 25)).
191
See 11 Del. (6 Houst.) 181, 210 (Del. Super. Ct. 1880) (“Every man has the
right, guaranteed to him by the constitution, to print upon any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty . . . . This law applies to publishers and editors as well
183
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So did leading treatises and other reference works. Thomas Cooley’s A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations (1868) noted, in the section on “Liberty of Speech and of the Press,” that “the authorities have
generally held the publisher of a paper to the same rigid responsibility
192
with any other person who makes injurious communications.”
Townshend’s A Treatise on the Wrongs Called Slander and Libel (1868)
likewise noted, in the section on “freedom of the press,” that, “independently of certain statutory provisions[,] the law recognizes no distinction in principle between a publication by the proprietor of a
newspaper, and a publication by any other individual. A newspaper
proprietor . . . is liable for what he publishes in the same manner as
193
any other individual.” Morgan’s Law of Literature (1875) noted, “[A]
writer for a newspaper . . . stands in the same light precisely as other
men; he is in no way privileged. . . . [T]he freedom of the press is,
when rightly understood, commensurate and identical with the free194
dom of the individual, and nothing more.”
The one partial exception to this pattern appeared in the “Liberty
of the Press” discussion in Cooley’s Treatise on the Law of Torts (1879),
which suggested (without citation) that it “is not so clear” “whether
the conductor of a public journal has any privilege above others in
195
publishing.”
But even that treatise stated that “the freedom of the
press implies . . . a right in all persons to publish what they may see fit,
196
being responsible for the abuse of the right” and that “[t]he privilege of the press is not confined to those who publish newspapers and
other serials, but extends to all who make use of it to place infor197
mation before the public.”
as to other individuals, and they have no privilege in this State not common to everybody else.”).
192
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 455 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1868).
193
TOWNSHEND, supra note 188, § 252, at 343. Earlier, Townshend says that
“[w]hatever else may be intended by the phrase ‘freedom of the press,’ or ‘liberty of
the press,’ it means the freedom or liberty of those who conduct the press,” and in particular freedom from the requirement of a license to print. Id. at 342. But the more
specific statements quoted in the text make clear that Townshend is recognizing that
“those who conduct the press” had the same legal right as “any other individual” under
the “freedom of the press.”
194
2 MORGAN, supra note 187, at 410.
195
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 217 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1879).
196
Id. (emphasis added).
197
Id. at 219. A 1990 book quotes Detroit Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, 16 Mich. 447
(1868), as saying, “A special protection for newspapers within the common law was

VOLOKH_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

12/21/2011 5:47 PM

Freedom for the Press as an Industry or Technology?

501

Some of the sources mentioned in this Section spoke of the pressas-industry as having no special rights generally, while others noted
this specifically in the context of libel law. But it’s not surprising that
many of these assertions were made in libel cases. Freedom of the
press arguments in the 1800s were most commonly made in libel cases; libel law was probably the main restriction on publication. And
there were credible arguments for giving newspapers some special exemption from the severest aspects of libel law. As the “Freedom of the
Press” section of Townshend’s Slander and Libel treatise noted, with
sympathy,
[A]s respects newspapers, it is argued that the exigencies of the business
of a newspaper editor demand a larger amount of freedom. That circumstances do not permit editors the opportunity to verify the truth,
prior to publication, of all they feel called upon to publish, and that they

necessary,”, but this appears to be an error. TIMOTHY W. GLEASON, THE WATCHDOG
CONCEPT: THE PRESS AND THE COURTS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 67 (1990).
No such passage is present in the cited case, and the purported quote does not seem
like an accurate summary of the case either. The court opinion concludes only that
punitive damages are unavailable when a publisher took suitable care to avoid publishing libels written by others, including by hiring “competent editors.” 16 Mich. at 454.
This seems to be much the same rule that some courts applied to other employers,
who were not held liable in punitive damages for the actions of their employees unless
the employers were aware of the employees’ negligent habits or failed to properly supervise them. See generally THOMAS G. SHEARMAN & AMASA A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE § 601, at 655 (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1869). And
two decades later, the Michigan Supreme Court actually held unconstitutional a statute
that limited presumed and punitive damages for publications in newspapers, on the
grounds that the statute violated the constitutional right to protect reputation and that
“the public press occupies no better ground than private persons publishing the same
libelous matter.” Park v. Detroit Free Press Co., 40 N.W. 731, 734 (Mich. 1888).
Likewise, Wilson v. Fitch, 41 Cal. 363 (1871), which the 1990 book cited, GLEASON,
supra, at 73-74, did not appear to extend any special protection to newspapers. The
court did state,
The public interest, and a due regard to the freedom of the press, demands that
its conductors should not be mulcted in punitive damages for publications on
subjects of public interest, made from laudable motives, after due inquiry as to
the truth of the facts stated, and in the honest belief that they were true.
Id. at 383. But punitive damages were generally available in libel cases only when the
jury found the defendant acted from “ill-will” (which would not be a “laudable motive[]”), TOWNSHEND, supra note 188, § 290, at 382; and absence of an “honest belief
that [defendant’s statements] were true” would itself be evidence of ‘ill-will,” id. § 388,
at 475-76. The court thus seemed to be applying to newspapers only the same protection against punitive damages that the law generally gave libel defendants. A later California decision treated Wilson as consistent with the view that a reporter “has no more
right” to convey allegedly defamatory material “than has a person not connected with a
newspaper.” Gilman v. McClatchy, 44 P. 241, 243 (Cal. 1896) (quoting McAllister v.
Free Detroit Press Co., 43 N.W. 431, 437 (Mich. 1889)).
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198

But despite the presence and plausibility of these arguments, the cases
kept saying (in Townshend’s words): “A newspaper proprietor . . . is lia199
ble for what he publishes in the same manner as any other individual.”
Some other cases spoke of the liberty of the press in cases where
the speaker was not a member of the institutional press. In 1876, Life
Ass’n of America v. Boogher held, just as Brandreth v. Lance had held, that
it would violate “the freedom of the press or of speech”—“the right to
speak, write, or print, . . . secured to every one” by the state constitution—for a court to enjoin publications and oral statements by a busi200
nessman that criticized another business. In 1846, Fisher v. Patterson,
like many of the earlier cases from 1784 to 1840, mentioned the liberty of the press in a case that involved a defendant who was apparently
a businessman and a politician, not a newspaperman, though the
201
court concluded that the liberty did not substantively extend to libels.
Finally, Thomas Cooley, the leading American constitutional
202
commentator of the second half of the nineteenth century, wrote in
1880 that “[b]ooks, pamphlets, circulars, &c. are . . . as much within
203
[the freedom of the press] as the periodical issues.” This too shows
that the liberty of the press extended to material that was generally
not written by full-time newspaper and magazine writers and—at least
in the case of circulars—to material that was often not funded by
members of the press-as-industry.
The rule thus had not changed from the early Republic to the
Ratification era: “the press” in “[t]he freedom . . . of the press” was
198

TOWNSHEND, supra note 188, § 252, at 343; see also Hotchkiss v. Oliphant, 2 Hill
510, 513 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (noting that the defendant had argued for special privilege as a newspaper editor, but rejecting that argument).
199
TOWNSHEND, supra note 188, § 252 at 343.
200
3 Mo. App. 173, 180 (1876); see also Suit Against the Life Association of America, 1
INS. L.J. 239, 239 (1871) (reporting that Boogher was “a trustee of the Life Association
of America, and one of the oldest policy holders in the company”).
201
Fisher v. Patterson, 14 Ohio 418, 426-27 (1846); see also NELSON W. EVANS &
EMMONS B. STIVERS, A HISTORY OF ADAMS COUNTY, OHIO 260-61 (1900) (describing
John Fisher as a politician, judge, and businessman who was “fond of contributing political articles to newspapers,” but not suggesting that he ever owned or operated a
newspaper).
202
See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 616 (2008) (describing
Cooley as the “most famous” of the “late-19th-century legal scholar[s]”); Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 225 (1995) (referring to “the great constitutional
scholar Thomas Cooley”).
203
THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 282 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1880).
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seen as referring to the press-as-technology, not to the press-asindustry.
V. THE UNDERSTANDING FROM 1881 TO 1930
By 1881, the view that the press-as-industry has no special constitutional rights had become a firmly entrenched orthodoxy that
would continue for the next fifty years and beyond. Consider, for
instance, Coleman v. MacLennan (1908), the case that first recognized
something like an “actual malice” test for speech about public officials, and that was later cited prominently for this proposition by New
204
York Times Co. v. Sullivan:
Section 11 of the [Kansas] Bill of Rights sets off the inviolability of liberty
of the press from the right of all persons freely to speak, write, or publish
their sentiments on all subjects, and this fact has given rise to claims on
the part of newspaper publishers of special privileges not enjoyed in
common by all. . . . So far [such claims] have been rejected by the courts,
and the present consensus of judicial opinion is that the press has the
205
same rights as an individual, and no more.

Likewise, Negley v. Farrow (1883) held that “[t]he liberty of the press
guaranteed by the Constitution is a right belonging to every one,
206
whether proprietor of a newspaper or not.” And these were just two
of the many cases to acknowledge the press-as-technology view during
207
the last decades of the nineteenth century and during the start of
208
the twentieth.
204

376 U.S. 254, 280-82 (1964).
98 P. 281, 286 (Kan. 1908).
206
60 Md. 158, 176 (1883).
207
See, e.g., Riley v. Lee, 11 S.W. 713, 714 (Ky. 1889) (“By the provisions of the
United States and the state constitutions guarantying the ‘freedom of the press’ it was
simply intended to secure to the conductors of the press the same rights and immunities that are enjoyed by the public at large.”); Park v. Detroit Free Press Co., 40 N.W.
731, 734 (Mich. 1888) (“[T]he public press occupies no better ground than private
persons publishing the same libelous matter . . . .”); Bronson v. Bruce, 26 N.W. 671,
672 (Mich. 1886) (“The law makes no distinction between the newspaper publisher
and any private person who may publish an article in a newspaper or other printed
form.”); Pratt v. Pioneer Press, 14 N.W. 62, 63 (Minn. 1882) (“[I]n the publication of
news, or in criticising men and things, the publisher of a newspaper has no privileges
or immunities not possessed by any citizen.”); Kahn v. Cincinnati Times-Star, 10 Ohio
Dec. 599, 603 (Super. Ct. Cincinnati 1890) (“The publisher of a newspaper has exactly
the same [constitutional] rights and [is] responsible to exactly the same extent for the
abuse of that right as any other citizen.”); Regensperger v. Kiefer, 7 A. 284, 285 (Pa.
1887) (“The publisher or proprietor of a newspaper stands before a Court and before
a jury like any other man.” (quoting jury instructions)); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 8
Pa. C. 399, 405 (Pa. Quarter Sess. 1890) (stating that the constitutional free press pro205
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Reference works of the era echoed this press-as-technology view,
explaining that newspapers had the same freedoms of speech as private citizens. For instance, one 1917 work noted that “[i]t is well settled that a newspaper or other printed publication has, as such, no
peculiar privilege in commenting on matters of public interest. It has
no greater privilege with respect to such comment than has any pri209
vate person.” Similarly, a 1901 encyclopedia described the freedom
of the press as “only a more extensive and improved use of the liberty
of speech which prevailed before printing became general, and is the
right belonging to every one, whether the conductor of a newspaper
210
And a 1905 reference work noted that newspapers are
or not.”
treated the same as other speakers when it comes to freedom of the
press claims in libel cases, and that this view “has been affirmed by the
211
courts of this country and England with great uniformity.”

vision “does not give to newspapers, as such, any privileges or rights which are not given to every citizen of the state. . . . There is no distinction between newspapers as a
privileged class, and other citizens as enjoying inferior rights”); Banner Publ’g Co. v.
State, 84 Tenn. 176, 183-84 (1885) (concluding that, with reference to the state constitutional provision for liberty of the press, “the conductor of a public journal has . . . no
more rights than the private citizen”).
208
See, e.g., State ex rel. Crow v. Shepherd, 76 S.W. 79, 94 (Mo. 1903) (stating, in
the discussion of “the liberty of the press,” “It is no new claim that newspapers have a
greater privilege than the ordinary citizen. This is a grave error.”); Fitch v. Daily News
Publ’g Co., 217 N.W. 947, 948 (Neb. 1928) (“The usual constitutional guaranty of the
freedom of the press . . . is intended simply to secure to the conductors of the press the
same rights and immunities, and such only, as are enjoyed by the public at large.”
(quoting 17 RULING CASE LAW § 95, at 349-50 (William M. McKinney & Burdett A.
Rich eds., 1917))); Streeter v. Emmons Cnty. Farmers’ Press, 222 N.W. 455, 457 (N.D.
1928) (concluding that “[n]ewspapers . . . have no greater privilege [under libel law]
than private individuals,” when it comes to the dividing line between “license” and “liberty of the press” (citing 17 RULING CASE LAW, supra, § 95, at 349)); Williams v. Hicks Printing Co., 150 N.W. 183, 188 (Wis. 1914) (stating that “[t]he law as to what is within the
field of conditional privilege . . . applies to newspapers as well as to individuals” because
“[t]he freedom of the press has never been . . . extended so as to accord to [newspapers]
special rights to injure or destroy human character by libelous publications”).
209
Annotation, Comment on Matter of Public Interest as Libel or Slander, 1917B ANNOTATED CASES AM. & ENG. 409, 417 (William M. McKinney & H. Noyes Greene eds.,
1917); see also 17 RULING CASE LAW, supra note 208, § 95, at 349-50 (“The usual constitutional guaranty of the ‘freedom of the press’ . . . is intended simply to secure to the
conductors of the press the same rights and immunities, and such only, as are enjoyed
by the public at large.”).
210
18 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF LAW 1051 (David S. Garland
& Lucius P. McGehee eds., 2d ed. 1901); see also McAllister v. Detroit Free Press Co., 43
N.W. 431, 437 (Mich. 1889) (repeating this idea almost verbatim); HAYTER, supra note
10, at 8 (similarly explaining, in 1754, that “[p]rinting is only a more extensive and
improved Kind of Speech”); see also supra text accompanying note 60.
211
8 JUDICIAL AND STATUTORY DEFINITIONS OF WORDS AND PHRASES 7706 (1905).
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VI. THE MODERN FIRST AMENDMENT ERA:
1931 TO NOW IN THE SUPREME COURT
A. Three Models
The first Supreme Court decisions striking down government ac212
tion under the First Amendment came in 1931. Within the following decade, the Court adopted the press-as-technology view of the
Free Press Clause, and the Court’s decisions since then have stuck to
that view.
But since 1970, this state of the law has been cast into some doubt.
Though the Court’s majority holdings have solidly supported the
press-as-technology view, some dicta in the opinions have suggested
that the Court might be open to the press-as-industry view in at least
some cases. And a few lower court decisions have indeed adopted a
press-as-industry position as to some First Amendment questions.
To accurately summarize the disagreements among the courts—
and the continuing dominance of the press-as-technology view, despite those disagreements—it’s helpful to identify three possible approaches to the question:
1. Under the “all-speakers-equal” view, communicators are
treated the same whether or not they use mass communications. “The freedom of speech, or of the press,” the
theory goes, provides the same protection for the rights to
213
“speak,” “write,” and “print.”
2. Under the “mass-communications-more-protected” view,
the Free Press Clause provides special protection to all users of the press-as-technology.
3. Under the “press-as-industry-specially-protected” view, the
Free Press Clause provides special protection to the institutional press.
The first two approaches both fit the press-as-technology model.
(The historical origin of the distinction between the first two ap-

212

See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 701-02, 722-23 (1931); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). Fiske v. Kansas, the other possible candidate for the first such decision, rested on the conclusion that the Due Process Clause
was violated because there wasn’t adequate evidence to convict the speaker under the
statute. 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927). Stromberg and Near, on the other hand, expressly relied on the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press.
213
See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
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214

proaches is outside the scope of this Article.
I mention them separately only because understanding the difference helps explain some
of the court decisions discussed below.) The third approach is, of
course, the press-as-industry model.
Here, then, is what has happened.
B. The Supreme Court: “All Speakers Equal”
1. Generally
As discussed below, the Court’s decisions since 1931 generally take
the all-speakers-equal view. The one possible exception comes in Jus215
tice Powell’s influential concurrence in Branzburg v. Hayes (1972),
which has been read by some lower courts as adopting a masscommunications-more-protected approach.
Many of the post-1931 cases do sometimes refer to the concerns
and rights of “newspapers” and “the media.” Consider, for instance,
the passage in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan that says, “Whether or not
a newspaper can survive a succession of such judgments, the pall of
fear and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice to public
criticism is an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms
216
But this seems to stem just from courts’ tendency
cannot survive.”
to focus on the facts of the cases before them. Thus, for instance,
within about a year of Sullivan, the Court applied its holding to two
non-newspaper defendants—a district attorney who made allegedly
217
libelous statements at a press conference, and an arrestee who was
sued for sending an allegedly libelous letter to a sheriff and an alleg-

214

For evidence suggesting that the freedom of the press was seen as quite different from the freedom of speech, see generally Anderson, supra note 67, at 521-27. For
evidence suggesting that the two were seen as providing essentially the same protections, though one covered printing and the other speaking, see United States v. Sheldon, 5 Blume Sup. Ct. Trans. 337, 346 (Mich. 1829), which stated that “[t]he constitution of the United States places the freedom of speech and of the press upon the same
footing,” Lange, supra note 17, at 88-99, and sources cited supra Section I.E.
215
408 U.S. 665, 709-10 (1972).
216
376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348
(1974) (stating that the Court’s decision “shields the press and broadcast media from
the rigors of strict liability for defamation”); Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin,
418 U.S. 264, 292 (1974) (characterizing an earlier labor law case as “adopt[ing] as a
rule of labor law pre-emption the constitutional standard of media liability for defamation originally enunciated for libel actions by public officials in New York Times Co. [v.
Sullivan]”).
217
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 64-67 (1964).
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218

edly libelous press release to the wire services.
The references to
newspaper speech, then, may simply describe the speech involved in
each case, rather than limiting the constitutional protection just to
newspapers.
Because of this, the analysis below looks at the aggregate holdings
of the cases and at the specific discussions of the all-speakersequal vs. mass-communications-more-protected vs. press-as-industryspecially-protected question. And such a focus makes clear the Court’s
general adoption of the all-speakers-equal model (again, with the possible exception of Justice Powell’s Branzburg v. Hayes concurrence).
2. The “Generally Applicable Laws” Cases
The Court’s first case on whether the press-as-industry had special
219
constitutional rights was Associated Press v. NLRB (1937).
The Associated Press argued that the Free Press Clause secured a right to fire
writers and editors for any reason, including labor union membership
(which the AP thought could lead to bias in reporting news), notwith220
The Court disagreed, holding that
standing federal labor law.
“[t]he publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the ap221
plication of general laws.”
The Court has repeated this rejection of the press-as-industryspecially-protected model in cases involving many subjects, including
222
the Fair Labor Standards Act, antitrust law, and others. In Branzburg
v. Hayes (1972), for instance, the majority rejected a newsgatherer’s
privilege, adopting the all-speakers-equal—and equally unprotected—
223
approach. The Court’s decision was partly motivated by its unwillingness to give special constitutional protection to a particular industry:

218

See Henry v. Collins, 158 So. 2d 28, 30-31 (Miss. 1963), rev’d per curiam, 380 U.S.
356 (1965).
219
301 U.S. 103 (1937).
220
Id. at 115-17.
221
Id. at 132.
222
See, e.g., Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969) (stating
that the press receives no special treatment under the First Amendment with respect to
the antitrust laws); Mabee v. White Plains Publ’g Co., 327 U.S. 178, 184 (1946) (stating,
in the labor context, that the press “has no special immunity from laws applicable to
business in general”); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (stating
that the press receives no special treatment under the First Amendment with respect to
the antitrust laws).
223
See 408 U.S. 665, 689-93 (1972) (“We are asked to create another [privilege] by
interpreting the First Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other
citizens do not enjoy. This we decline to do.”).
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The administration of a constitutional newsman’s privilege would present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order. Sooner or later, it would be necessary to define those categories of newsmen who
qualified for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the
large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition
methods. . . .
Freedom of the press is a “fundamental personal right” which “is not
confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. . . . The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information
and opinion.” Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450, 452 (1938). See also
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 111 (1943). The informative function asserted by representatives of the organized press in the present cases is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists.
Almost any author may quite accurately assert that he is contributing to
the flow of information to the public, that he relies on confidential
sources of information, and that these sources will be silenced if he is
224
forced to make disclosures before a grand jury.

Justice Powell’s three-paragraph concurrence in Branzburg, which
225
was open to a relatively weak newsgatherer’s privilege, did implicitly
reject the all-speakers-equal approach. Under Justice Powell’s approach, a person who gathers information for future mass communication would get a privilege of some unspecified force. But a person who
gathers information just to convey it to business partners or friends
would presumably not be entitled to a privilege, since allowing the privilege to apply so broadly would eviscerate the general duty to testify.
224

Id. at 703-05. In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, the Court likewise rejected a claim of
special press immunity from search warrants. 436 U.S. 547, 565-67 (1978). Only Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Marshall, would have adopted what appears to be a pressas-industry-specially-protected model. See id. at 571-72 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice
Powell’s concurrence suggested that “independent values protected by the First
Amendment” should be considered in deciding whether a warrant should be issued, id.
at 570 (Powell, J., concurring), but Justice Powell might well have been referring to
First Amendment interests of speakers generally, and not just of the press-as-industry.
Indeed, the Zurcher majority, which Justice Powell joined, cited an earlier nonpress opinion which determined that the particularity of the Warrant Clause should be read more
strictly when the search was for “books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments.” Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S.
476, 485-86 (1965), quoted in Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 564.
225
See Branzburg, 665 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell did
not endorse the proposed absolute privilege urged by Justice Douglas’s dissent, nor the
proposed qualified privilege urged by Justice Stewart’s dissent, which could only be
overcome by a showing of necessity to serve a compelling government interest. Id.
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Nonetheless, Justice Powell’s concurrence is probably most reasonably read as following the mass-communications-more-protected
model rather than the press-as-industry-specially-protected model.
Justice Powell joined the majority’s opinion, which rejected the pressas-industry model. And though Justice Powell’s concurrence spoke of
226
the rights of “newsmen,” it didn’t go into any detail about whether
“newsman” meant simply someone who worked for a newspaper or
whether the term also included someone who gathered the news for
just one project or occasional projects. Indeed, as Section VII.A will
discuss, nearly all lower court cases have either dismissed Justice Powell’s opinion as merely a concurrence, or have read it as endorsing the
mass-communications-specially-protected approach rather than the
press-as-industry-specially-protected” approach.
Finally, and most recently, in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. (1991), the
Court rejected a newspaper’s attempt to use the First Amendment as a
defense to a promissory estoppel suit brought by a source whose name
227
was published despite the newspaper’s promise of anonymity.
“[G]enerally applicable laws,” the Court held, “do not offend the First
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has
228
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”
The Court has long been willing to give speakers generally some exemptions from “generally applicable laws.” This is especially true
when the laws end up applying to speakers because of the content of
their speech—for instance, when a breach of the peace prosecution,
an intentional infliction of emotional distress lawsuit, an interference
with business relations claim, or an antitrust claim is based on the con229
tent of the speaker’s message. But within this category of speakers,
neither members of the press-as-industry nor users of the press-astechnology have received more protection than other speakers.

226

Id.
501 U.S. 663, 665-66 (1991).
228
Id. at 669. Three of the four dissenters expressly agreed on this point. See id. at
673 (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall & Souter, JJ., dissenting) (stating that
“[n]ecessarily, the First Amendment protection” against promissory estoppel liability
for revealing the name of a source “afforded respondents would be equally available to
nonmedia defendants”). The fourth dissenter, Justice O’Connor, expressed no opinion on the issue.
229
See Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of
Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
1277, 1287-93 (2005) (citing pre-2005 examples of such cases); see also Snyder v.
Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (applying this principle to a lawsuit for intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
227
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3. The Literature Distribution Cases
The Court has likewise rejected the press-as-industry view in the
cases dealing with people prosecuted for handing out printed material. The first such case, Lovell v. City of Griffin (1938), expressly held
that the freedom of the press extends beyond the press-as-industry:
The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It
necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed have been
historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas
Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest. The press in its
historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which af230
fords a vehicle of information and opinion.
231

And Lovell was reaffirmed in Schneider v. State (1939), Martin v. City of
232
233
Struthers (1943), and Jamison v. Texas (1943), in which the Court
cited the Free Press Clause in striking down ordinances that limited
the distribution of handbills, circulars, and advertisements—
ordinances that, unlike the Lovell ordinance, didn’t even apply to typical newspapers or magazines. In Schneider and Martin, the Court discussed both the freedom of the press and the freedom of speech, but
in Jamison it mentioned only the freedom of the press.
Moreover, at around the time the Court decided these cases, it also applied the same rules to speakers who weren’t using mass communications technology at all—door-to-door canvassers, picketers,
234
Put together, these cases
speakers in public places, and the like.
thus embrace the all-speakers-equal view, and reject the press-asindustry-specially-protected view.
4. The Communicative Tort Cases
The results of the Supreme Court’s communicative tort cases seem to
be most consistent with the all-speakers-equal approach, though they

230

303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938). The city’s brief had argued that nothing in the record suggested “that the appellant is a member of the press or that an ordinance
abridging the freedom of the press would apply to her.” Brief of Appellee at 12, Lovell,
303 U.S. 444 (No. 391). But the brief cited no precedents supporting the view that the
freedom of the press protected only “member[s] of the press”—I suspect because no
such precedents were available.
231
308 U.S. 147, 160-64 (1939).
232
319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
233
318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943).
234
See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940) (door-to-door canvassing); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940) (picketing); Hague v. CIO,
307 U.S. 496, 512-14 (1939) (speeches in public places and in privately owned halls).
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might also be reconciled with the mass-communications-more-protected
approach. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), Sullivan sued over an
advertisement that criticized him, naming both the New York Times, which
235
published the advertisement, and several ministers who signed it. The
Court reversed the verdict against both the newspaper and the signers,
236
applying the same “actual malice” rule to both.
In the process, the Court seemed to suggest that this identical rule
stemmed from two different sources—the Free Press Clause as to
newspapers, and the Free Speech Clause as to the signers:
That the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are
sold. . . . Any other conclusion would discourage newspapers from
carrying “editorial advertisements” of this type, and so might shut off an
important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities—who wish to
exercise their freedom of speech even though they are not members of the press. Cf.
237
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164.

Though Lovell had asserted the Free Press Clause rights of pamphleteering and leafleting defendants who were not “members of the
press,” Sullivan recharacterized such rights as being the “freedom of
speech,” not the “freedom of the press.”
But it’s not clear what to make of the particular label that the
Court used for the rights involved, since in the last half century the
Court has tended to use “freedom of speech” broadly. And in any
event, the bottom line was that the signers of the New York Times advertisement—who were communicating through the mass media but
weren’t themselves newspaper owners or writers—were given the benefit of precisely the same constitutional rule as the newspaper.
238
The same principle was applied in Garrison v. Louisiana (1964).
Garrison, a district attorney, was prosecuted for criminal libel because
239
of his statement at a press conference condemning several judges.
The Court held that Garrison was entitled to the protection of the Sullivan “actual malice” rule, without being influenced by Garrison’s not
being a member of the press-as-industry.

235
236
237
238
239

376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
Id. at 283-84.
Id. at 266 (emphasis added) (select citations omitted).
379 U.S. 64 (1964).
Id. at 64-65.
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240

The Garrison decision did speak of the “freedom of expression,”
rather than the “freedom of the press.” But though Garrison could
have been seen as exercising the “freedom of the press”—he was trying to convey his views through the press, though filtered by the reporters who wrote the actual stories—the broader “freedom of expression” likely seemed to be a more natural label for the right involved
here. And in any event, nothing turned on the label: the Free Speech
Clause rule that protected Garrison was identical to the Free Press
Clause that protected the New York Times.
Likewise, in Henry v. Collins (1965), the Court applied the Sullivan
rule to an arrestee who issued a statement—sent to the sheriff and to
241
wire services —alleging that his arrest stemmed from a “diabolical
242
plot.” In St. Amant v. Thompson (1968), the Court applied the Sullivan rule to a politician who was sued for libel based on a statement he
243
The Court didn’t indicate in either
read on a televised program.
case whether the decisions were based on the Free Speech Clause or
the Free Press Clause, likely because it made no difference. And
McDonald v. Smith (1985) further reinforced the notion that the rules
are the same under all the expression-related clauses of the First
Amendment, by holding that the Petition Clause provided the same
protection against libel lawsuits in petitions to the government as did
244
cases such as Garrison and Sullivan.
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. (1991) echoed this view by holding that
the press-as-industry gets no exemption from laws that don’t single out
245
the press and by citing a communicative tort case, Zacchini v. Scripps246
Howard Broadcasting Co., as an example of this principle. The opinion cited Zacchini for the proposition that “[t]he press, like others in247
It thus appears
terested in publishing,” is bound by copyright law.
that the Court believes that the press-as-industry gets no exemptions

240

Id. at 75.
158 So. 2d 28, 30 (Miss. 1963), rev’d per curiam, 380 U.S. 356 (1965).
242
380 U.S. at 356.
243
390 U.S. 727, 728, 733 (1968).
244
472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985).
245
501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991). For more on why Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. is properly read as discussing laws that apply equally to the press and to other speakers, see Volokh, supra note 229, at 1294-97.
246
501 U.S. at 669 (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562,
576-79 (1977)).
247
Id.
241
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from communicative torts generally—not just libel, but also copyright
248
infringement, and likely, as in Zacchini itself, the right of publicity.
Bartnicki v. Vopper (2000) likewise held that the First Amendment
equally protected a radio broadcaster and the person who gave him
249
allegedly actionable material.
Bartnicki arose under federal statutes
that banned both the interception of cellular phone conversations
and the willful dissemination of such conversations, including dissemination by people who were unconnected to the person who did the
250
An unknown person had intercepted a conversation
interception.
in which local teachers’ union leaders seemed to be discussing possi251
ble violent attacks on school board members. That tape was left in
the mailbox of Jack Yocum—“the head of a local taxpayers’ organization” and a political foe of the union—and Yocum delivered it to ra252
The union leaders sued both
dio show host Frederick Vopper.
253
Yocum and Vopper.
The Court concluded that the First Amendment trumped the ban
254
on dissemination, at least on the facts of the case. But in the process
of deciding the First Amendment question, the Court stressed that it
255
“dr[ew] no distinction between the media respondents and Yocum.”
The first citation the Court gave in support of this statement was to
the passage from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan mentioned above,
which noted that “persons who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities” are protected by the First Amendment when they pay
256
others for access to their media platforms. The Court’s second citation was to a passage in First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti in which the Court held that “[t]he inherent worth of the
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not de-

248

See Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir.
2010) (observing that “copyright infringement . . . is often characterized as a tort,” and
treating it as such (citation omitted)). Copyright infringement is the intellectual
property analog of trespass—an interference with a property owner’s exclusive rights.
And in Zacchini, the Court treated copyright infringement as analogous to the right of
publicity tort. See 433 U.S. at 567.
249
532 U.S. 514, 525 n.8 (2001).
250
Id. at 523-24.
251
Id. at 518-19.
252
Id. at 519.
253
Id.
254
Id. at 535.
255
Id. at 525 & n.8.
256
376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
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pend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association,
257
union, or individual.”
Finally, Snyder v. Phelps (2011) held that picketers near a funeral
had a First Amendment defense to the tort of intentional infliction of
258
emotional distress.
The foremost precedent on the subject, Hustler
259
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, involved a media defendant, but Snyder followed and extended Hustler’s reasoning without any suggestion that
the picketers merited less protection than the professional publisher
in Hustler. The Snyder Court didn’t expressly discuss whether media
defendants should be treated differently from speakers—such as the
picketers in Snyder itself—who are neither members of the press-asindustry nor directly using channels of mass communication (except
insofar as they are hoping for media coverage). But the Court’s firm
acceptance of the analogy between Snyder and Hustler is consistent
with the press-as-technology view adopted by the other cases cited in
this Section.
The Court thus has not accepted the press-as-industry-speciallyprotected view in communicative torts cases. And it also seems—
though the matter is less clear—that it has taken the all-speakersequal view rather than the mass-communications-more-protected view.
First, the cases above show that the Court considers the same rules
to apply interchangeably under both the Free Speech Clause and the
Free Press Clause. This suggests that these rules apply to speakers in
non-mass-communications settings exercising their Free Speech
Clause rights (say, a hypothetical Garrison or Yocum who is making
accusations only to his political allies) as much as to speakers who are
exercising their Free Speech Clause rights by speaking to the media.
Whatever distinction the Free Press Clause might or might not draw between mass communications and other communications, there’s no indication that the Free Speech Clause could embody such a distinction.
Second, the Court in McDonald v. Smith (1985) took the view that
the Petition Clause rules are the same as those applicable under both
260
the Free Speech Clause and the Free Press Clause. Speech in most
petitions to the government is not an attempt to engage in mass communications; for instance, the petitions in McDonald were letters to the
261
If such non-mass-communications speech to the govPresident.
257
258
259
260
261

435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011).
See 485 U.S. 46, 47-48 (1988).
472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985).
Id. at 480.

VOLOKH_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

12/21/2011 5:47 PM

Freedom for the Press as an Industry or Technology?

515

ernment is protected by the Petition Clause, and the First Amendment rules are the same under all three clauses, then non-masscommunications speech to others should also be protected by the
Free Speech Clause.
Third, one of the Supreme Court’s libel cases, Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. (1985), did involve speech that wasn’t
262
intended for mass communications technology.
The Dun & Bradstreet Court held that a credit report sent out to five subscribers was
263
But
less protected than speech on matters of “public concern.”
while Justice Powell’s opinion concluded that the limited audience for
the speech suggested that the speech was less likely to be of “public
concern”—and the other Justices in the majority presumably agreed
on this score—the Court expressly declined to adopt the media/nonmedia distinction the Vermont Supreme Court adopted be264
Indeed, five Justices (J ustice White in his concurrence, and
low.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens in dissent) specifi265
cally repudiated such a distinction.
Moreover, the test that the Court adopted, which only applies full
constitutional protection to speech on matters of “public concern,”
stemmed from a case in which some non-mass-communications
speech was found to be of “public concern”—Connick v. Myers
266
(1983). In Connick, a government employee’s question to coworkers
about whether supervisors illegally pressured employees to work on
267
political campaigns was deemed to raise issues of “public concern.”
Connick itself characterized an earlier case, Givhan v. Western Line Consol268
idated School District (1979), as involving speech on a matter of “public

262

See 472 U.S. 749, 751 (1985) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (noting that the
communication at issue was a “confidential” credit report).
263
Id. at 763; see also id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with Justice Powell on this point); id. at 774 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (same).
264
Id. at 753, 762 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
265
See id. at 781 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that “[s]uch a distinction is irreconcilable with the fundamental First
Amendment principle that ‘[t]he inherent worth of . . . speech in terms of its capacity
for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source’” (alteration
in original) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978))).
266
461 U.S. 138, 147-49 (1983).
267
Id. The Dun & Bradstreet plurality expressly relied on Connick in reaching its
holding. 472 U.S. at 759-61. Other speech in Connick was found not to be of public
concern, but only because it was seen as motivated merely by the speaker’s personal
employment dispute with her employer. 461 U.S. at 148-49.
268
439 U.S. 410 (1979).
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concern,” even though that speech consisted solely of an employee’s
269
statement to her employer.
And two years after Dun & Bradstreet,
Rankin v. McPherson (1987) held that a county employee’s statement to
270
a coworker qualified as speech on a matter of “public concern.”
So on balance, Dun & Bradstreet, McDonald, and the other cases
cited above suggest that the Court is taking the all-speakers-equal view
of the First Amendment. And the cases certainly do not support the
press-as-industry-specially-protected view.
5. The Campaign Speech Cases
Campaign finance laws have restricted various kinds of election271
related speech, including corporate speech, speech that costs more
272
273
Newspathan $1000, and speech coordinated with a candidate.
pers and magazines, of course, routinely engage in such speech, but
so-called “media exemptions” to campaign finance laws have excluded
274
the press-as-industry from such restrictions. The Supreme Court has
thus never considered a case in which the press-as-industry directly
sought a constitutional entitlement to exemptions from campaign finance law.
But in Citizens United v. FEC (2010), the Court did specifically re275
ject the press-as-industry-specially-protected model.
The majority
argued that if restrictions on corporate expression about candidates
were constitutional, then newspapers—which are mostly owned by
269

Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
483 U.S. 378, 386-87 (1987).
271
See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (invalidating such a restriction).
272
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1976) (per curiam) (invalidating such a
restriction).
273
See id. at 46-47 (discussing such a restriction).
274
See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (2006) (exempting from mandatory campaign
disclosures expenditures for the production of “any news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine,
or other periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any
political party, political committee, or candidate”); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666-67 (1990) (describing a state election law that exempted
any “expenditure by a broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other periodical
or publication for any news story, commentary, or editorial in support of or opposition
to a candidate for elective office . . . in the regular course of publication or broadcasting” (alteration in original)).
275
See 130 S. Ct. at 905-06 (“There is no precedent supporting laws that attempt to
distinguish between corporations which are deemed to be exempt as media corporations and those which are not . . . . This differential treatment cannot be squared with
the First Amendment.”).
270
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276

corporations—could likewise be restricted.
The dissent suggested
that this need not be so, since newspapers and similar publications
might still have Free Press Clause rights that other corporations inter277
ested in publishing material did not have. But the majority rejected
this argument, instead deciding that “the institutional press” has no
“constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers”—so that any
restrictions that could be constitutionally imposed on nonmedia cor278
porations could likewise be imposed on media corporations.
And though Citizens United overruled portions of McConnell v. FEC
279
280
(2003) and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990), those
earlier cases were not inconsistent with Citizens United on this point.
281
Austin noted that “the press’
McConnell was silent on the issue.
unique societal role may not entitle the press to greater protection
under the Constitution,” and held only that a media exemption was
282
constitutionally permissible, not that it was constitutionally mandatory.
In the process, the Court in Austin cited First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978), another campaign speech case that rejected the
“suggestion that communication by corporate members of the institutional press is entitled to greater constitutional protection than the
283
same communication by” nonmedia corporations.
Three of the
four dissenters in Bellotti agreed with the majority on this point, concluding that “the First Amendment does not immunize media corporations any more than other types of corporations from restrictions
upon electoral contributions and expenditures,” presumably includ284
ing expenditures incurred to convey their views about the election.
In the Court’s first campaign finance speech case, United States v.
CIO (1948), a four-Justice concurrence—written by Justice Rutledge
and joined by Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy—likewise rejected
285
the press-as-industry-specially-protected model.
In that case, the
CIO challenged a federal ban on the use of corporate and union

276

Id. at 906.
Id. at 951 n.57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
278
Id. at 905 (majority opinion) (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
279
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
280
494 U.S. 652.
281
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
282
Austin, 494 U.S. at 668.
283
435 U.S. 765, 782 n.18 (1978).
284
Id. at 808 n.8 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.).
285
335 U.S. 106, 154-55 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring in the judgment).
277
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286

funds for election-related speech.
The majority interpreted the
287
statute narrowly, as excluding union-owned newspapers.
But the
concurring Justices would have gone further and invalidated the statute altogether, holding as a general matter that sporadic publication
by nonmedia organizations is entitled to the same constitutional protection as regular publications:
I know of nothing in the Amendment’s policy or history which turns or
permits turning the applicability of its protections upon the difference
between regular and merely casual or occasional distributions. Indeed
pamphleteering was a common mode of exercising freedom of the
press before and at the time of the Amendment’s adoption. It cannot
have been intended to tolerate exclusion of this form of exercising that
288
freedom.

The majority’s conclusion that the statute did not cover the CIO’s
speech made it unnecessary for the majority to respond to this
argument.
Finally, there has been no indication from campaign speech cases
that the Court would accept even the mass-communications-moreprotected model of the Free Press Clause; in fact, McConnell v. FEC
289
(2003) quickly rejected this model. It seems unlikely that the Justices would treat spending $10,000 to print and mail campaign literature
as constitutionally different from spending $10,000 to organize a polit290
ical rally.

286

Id. at 108-09 (majority opinion).
Id. at 123-24.
288
Id. at 155 (Rutledge, J., concurring in the judgment).
289
See 540 U.S. 93, 209 n.89 (2003). A Congressman, an advocacy group, and
some other plaintiffs in McConnell argued at the district court level that they were entitled to Free Press Clause protection, on a press-as-technology theory. See McConnell v.
FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 233-34 & n.61 (D.D.C.) (per curiam), aff’d in part, 540 U.S.
93 (2003), overruled in part as to other matters by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010). But the district court took an all-speakers-equal view, and concluded that the
Free Press Clause provided no more protection for mass communications speakers
than does the Free Speech Clause, and that the reasoning of Buckley v. Valeo allows
some restrictions on both Free Speech Clause and Free Press Clause rights as to campaign-related speech. Id. at 234-36. And the Supreme Court expressly agreed with the
district court on this point. 540 U.S. at 209 n.89.
290
The Court’s campaign finance cases have all discussed the First Amendment
generally, with occasional references to the freedom of speech. See, e.g., Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (mentioning the First Amendment 109 times, and the “freedom of speech” and “free speech” only thirteen times in total).
287
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6. The Access to Government Facilities Cases
In Pell v. Procunier (1974), the Court likewise adopted the allspeakers-equal view as to access to government facilities. Three “professional journalists” sought the right to interview prison inmates faceto-face, but the Court disagreed:
“It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not
available to the public generally. . . . Newsmen have no constitutional
right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public
is excluded.” Branzburg v. Hayes, [408 U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972)]. Similarly, newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public.
The First and Fourteenth Amendments bar government from interfering in any way with a free press. The Constitution does not, however,
require government to accord the press special access to information not
291
shared by members of the public generally.

Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. (1974), decided the same day, took the
292
same view. Even Justice Powell’s dissent, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, expressly said,
[N]either any news organization nor reporters as individuals have constitutional rights superior to those enjoyed by ordinary citizens. The guarantees of the First Amendment broadly secure the rights of every citizen;
they do not create special privileges for particular groups or individuals.
For me, at least, it is clear that persons who become journalists acquire
thereby no special immunity from governmental regulation. To this ex293
tent I agree with the majority.

Justice Douglas, dissenting in Pell and Saxbe, disagreed, arguing in Pell
that “the press” is “the institution which ‘[t]he Constitution specifically selected . . . to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs,’” and that the press-as-industry stood on a different footing from
294
But the majority did not accept
the public when it came to access.
this view; and even though Justices Brennan and Marshall joined
Douglas’s dissent, their views on this issue are hard to pin down—they

291

Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833-34 (1974) (citation altered).
417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974); see also id. (“[N]ewsmen have no constitutional right
of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public.” (quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at 834)).
293
Id. at 857 (Powell, J., dissenting).
294
417 U.S. at 841 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
292
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also joined Justice Powell’s dissent in Saxbe, which contradicted Douglas’s view on this point.
A majority of the Justices in Houchins v. KQED, Inc. (1978) likewise
accepted the Pell view in rejecting a claimed right of access to prisons
295
for videorecording purposes.
Three of the seven participating Justices asserted that the press has no extra First Amendment rights be296
yond those held by the public at large. Three more quoted similar
language from Pell, without any suggestion that they disagreed with
297
it. Only Justice Stewart, concurring in the judgment, concluded that
the media should have the right to videorecord prison conditions
298
even if the general public lacked that right.
Finally, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (1980), which held
that the First Amendment generally prohibited the closure of trials,
Justice Brennan’s concurrence ( j oined by Justice Marshall) expressly
noted that the case didn’t raise the question “whether the media
299
should enjoy greater access rights than the general public.” But the
majority in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. (1978) had answered
the question in the negative, holding that “[t]he First Amendment
generally grants the press no right to information about a trial superi300
And before Nixon, Estes v. Texas
or to that of the general public.”
(1965) stated in dicta that “[a]ll [journalists] are entitled to the same
301
rights [of access to trials] as the general public.”
7. The Footnotes
So it seems that the Court is likely following the all-speakers-equal
approach and is definitely not following the “special protection for the
press as industry” approach. Still, from 1979 to 1990, footnotes in five

295

See 438 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1978) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 11.
297
Id. at 27-28 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan & Powell, JJ., dissenting) (quoting
Pell, 417 U.S. 834). The dissent’s view was that the policy unconstitutionally interfered
with access to information about the prison, both for the press and the public as a
whole. Id. at 28-30.
298
Id. at 16-17 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]erms of access that
are reasonably imposed on individual members of the public may, if they impede effective reporting without sufficient justification, be unreasonable as applied to journalists . . . .”).
299
448 U.S. 555, 586 n.2 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
300
435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978); see also id. (denying a claimed right to make copies of
tape recordings introduced at a criminal trial). Three Justices dissented in Nixon, but
none of the dissenters discussed the First Amendment question. See id. at 611.
301
381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
296
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majority opinions expressly reserved the question whether “nonmedia
defendant[s]” were unprotected by parts of the Court’s emerging libel
302
case law, even though a majority of the Justices who sat on the Court
during that era—Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and
White—had, on various occasions, concluded that nonmedia defend303
This has sigants should be treated the same as media defendants.
naled to lower courts that the question remains open. And a few lower
courts have indeed applied the First Amendment differently to media
and non-media defendants, both before 1979 and after.
VII. THE PRESS-AS-INDUSTRY IN THE LOWER
COURT CASES: 1970 TO NOW
From the 1930s to the 1960s, lower court cases often repeated that
the institutional press had no special First Amendment rights, whether
304
305
generally or regarding libel law, the duty to testify notwithstanding
302

See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 309 n.16 (1979);
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 n.16 (1979); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 492 n.8 (1984); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 779
n.4 (1986); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 n.6 (1990). Likewise, Chief
Justice Burger noted that “[t]he Court has not yet squarely resolved whether the Press
Clause confers upon the ‘institutional press’ any freedom from government restraint
not enjoyed by all others,” though he argued that the Free Press Clause should be read
as not conferring any such special protection. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 798-802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
303
See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 781
(1985) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (concluding that the proposed distinction between “media” and nonmedia defendants is
“irreconcilable with the fundamental First Amendment principle that ‘[t]he inherent
worth of . . . speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend
upon the identity of the source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual’” (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777)); id. at 773 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I agree with Justice Brennan that the First Amendment gives no more protection to the press in defamation suits than it does to others exercising their freedom of
speech.”); see also Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 23-24 n.2 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) (repeating Justice Brennan’s position in Dun & Bradstreet on the subject); Hepps,
475 U.S. at 780 (Brennan, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring) (same); cf. Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 674 (1991) (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall & Souter,
JJ., dissenting) (“Necessarily, the First Amendment protection [against promissory estoppel liability for revealing the name of a source] afforded respondents would be equally
available to nonmedia defendants.”). In Dun & Bradstreet, the other four Justices expressed no opinion on the issue; the dissent and Justice White discussed it because the
lower court and the parties had done so. See 472 U.S. at 773-74 (White, J., concurring in
the judgment); id. at 781 (Brennan, J, dissenting).
304
See, e.g., Curry v. Journal Publ’g Co., 68 P.2d 168, 174-75 (N.M. 1937) (stating,
in the discussion of the “freedom of the press,” that “[a] publisher of a newspaper has
the same rights, no more or less, than individuals, to speak, write, or publish his views
and sentiments, and is subject to the same restrictions”), overruled on other grounds by
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a promise of confidentiality made to a source, access to trials, or
308
access to government documents.
When, then, did the press-as-industry-specially-protected decisions
(and the mass-communications-more-protected decisions) first arise,
and how common have they been? Answering this might be both historically interesting and practically useful for determining just how
firmly rooted—or not—these models have become. And examining
cases that have adopted these models, especially the press-as-industryspecially-protected model, may identify helpful test cases for future
discussions of whether the models are wise.
The answer seems to be that the first cases departing from the allspeakers-equal model were decided in the 1970s. Moreover, even
since the 1970s, there have only been about a dozen press-as-industryRamirez v. Armstrong, 673 P.2d 822 (N.M. 1983); Layne v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234,
238 (Fla. 1933) (concluding that the “constitutional guaranty of ‘freedom of the press’”
“was simply intended to secure to the conductors of the press the same rights and immunities, and such rights and immunities only, as were enjoyed by the public at large”).
305
See, e.g., Leers v. Green, 131 A.2d 781, 788-89 (N.J. 1957) (concluding that the
American “freedom . . . of press” tracked the English rule that “the press and the public have the same right of fair comment,” a conclusion that in this case helped the
nonmedia defendants get the same protection as the media defendants); Swearingen v.
Parkersburg Sentinel Co., 26 S.E.2d 209, 215 (W. Va. 1943) (“The publisher of a newspaper has no greater privilege to publish defamatory matter than any other person.”).
306
See, e.g., State v. Buchanan, 436 P.2d 729, 731 (Or. 1968) (“Indeed, it would be
difficult to rationalize a rule that would create special constitutional rights for those
possessing credentials as news gatherers which would not conflict with the equalprivileges and equal-protection concepts also found in the Constitution. Freedom of
the press is a right which belongs to the public; it is not the private preserve of those
who possess the implements of publishing.” (footnote omitted)). Another case from
the 1950s, Rumely v. United States, concluded that a publisher had a right to refuse to
reveal the names of his customers to the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities; but the court’s reasoning rested on anonymous speech principles that applied beyond the press-as-industry and would have covered nonprofessional distributors of leaflets or pamphlets. 197 F.2d 166, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1952), aff’d on other grounds, 345 U.S.
41 (1953). The opinion repeatedly treated “books, pamphlets and other writings”
equally, id. at 173, 174, and stressed the value of protecting attempts to influence public opinion—an activity in which nonmedia actors have long participated, id. at 175.
307
See, e.g., Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 300 P.2d 163, 169 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956)
(“[M]embers of the press are in the same position as other members of the public and
have no greater right to be present at court hearings than has any other member of
the public,” and therefore “[t]he freedom of the press is in no way involved in this
proceeding.”); United Press Ass’ns v. Valente, 123 N.E.2d 777, 783 (N.Y. 1954) (“The
fact that petitioners are in the business of disseminating news gives them no special
right or privilege, not possessed by other members of the public.”).
308
See, e.g., Grand Forks Herald, Inc. v. Lyons, 101 N.W.2d 543, 547 (N.D. 1960)
(concluding that “the freedom of the press” gives “plaintiff as a newspaper . . . no
greater right of inspection than that given to the public generally”); Trimble v. Johnston, 173 F. Supp. 651, 655-56 (D.D.C. 1959) (same).
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specially-protected cases. Some of these cases seem to be motivated by
some lower courts’ unease with the First Amendment jurisprudence
announced by the Court in recent decades—especially in libel cases—
and are aimed at minimizing the scope of those protections. Other
cases seem to be motivated by other lower courts’ desire to extend
First Amendment protections, especially in cases of press access to private property, but to do so in a limited way.
But whatever the motivation, the press-as-industry-speciallyprotected cases represent a minority view: most lower court cases have
309
continued to follow the all-speakers-equal model.
Below, I discuss
both the press-as-industry-specially-protected cases and the cases that
reject this view, arranged by topic: (a) cases involving a newsgatherer’s privilege; (b) cases involving communicative torts (chiefly libel);
(c) cases involving claimed First Amendment exemptions from antidiscrimination laws; (d) cases involving a claimed First Amendment
right to access government operations, government property, and private property; and (e) campaign speech cases.
A. The Newsgatherer’s Privilege
The first decision rejecting the all-speakers-equal model—the dis310
trict court decision in In re Caldwell, which was largely reversed by
the Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes—was a newsgatherer’s privilege decision. Caldwell did not determine whether the privilege would
follow the mass-communications-more-protected model or the pressas-industry-specially-protected model. But lower court cases considering this issue have nearly unanimously rejected the press-as-industry309

See, for example, cases rejecting the journalist’s privilege infra note 311 and
cases rejecting a media/nonmedia distinction in libel cases infra note 321.
310
See 311 F. Supp. 358, 360 (N.D. Cal.) (ruling that a journalist’s testimony before
a grand jury should not “reveal confidential associations that impinge upon the effective exercise of his First Amendment right to gather news for dissemination to the public through the press”), vacated, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev’d sub nom. Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Garland v. Torre, written by then-Judge Stewart shortly
before he was appointed to the Supreme Court, noted “that we are not dealing here
with the use of the judicial process to force a wholesale disclosure of a newspaper’s
confidential sources of news, nor with a case where the identity of the news source is of
doubtful relevance or materiality.” 259 F.2d 545, 549-50 (2d Cir. 1958). This seems to
suggest that a privilege might be available if the news source is indeed “of doubtful relevance or materiality,” but the opinion never said outright that such a privilege was
available, and noted in a footnote two cases “to the effect that a journalist’s professional status does not entitle him to sources of news inaccessible to others.” Id. at 548 n.4
(citing Tribune Review Pub. Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958); Valente, 123
N.E.2d 777).
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specially-protected model: some reject any First Amendment newsgatherer’s privilege, reasoning that Justice Powell’s concurrence
311
doesn’t undercut the majority opinion, and others accept the privilege but apply it equally to non-press-as-industry newsgatherers.
Thus, the First, Second, Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, the
Minnesota Supreme Court, and several district courts together have
312
held that would-be book authors, professors doing research for a
313
possible future article, a film student and a professor trying to pro314
315
duce a documentary film, a political candidate, and political advo316
cacy groups were all potentially eligible for the privilege on the same
terms as ordinary journalists. The common threshold requirement
seems to be that the newsgatherer, “at the inception of the investigatory process, had the intent to disseminate to the public the infor317
The newsgatherer
mation obtained through the investigation.”
need not be a member of the press-as-industry.
The only newsgatherer’s privilege case I could find that seemed to
endorse the press-as-industry-specially-protected view is People v.
318
LeGrand, a 1979 New York intermediate appeals court case.
The
311

See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1148 (D.C.
Cir. 2006); McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 531-32 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Farber, 394 A.2d 330, 334
(N.J. 1978).
312
See Ayala v. Ayers, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1250 (S.D. Cal. 2009); Shoen v. Shoen,
5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir.
1987); United States v. Hubbard, 493 F. Supp. 202, 205 (D.D.C. 1979); see also In re
Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 128-30 (3d Cir. 1998) (endorsing Shoen and von Bulow, though
concluding that they were inapplicable to the case at hand).
313
See Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714-15 (1st Cir. 1998); see also
United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 938, 941 (D. Mass. 1971) (concluding that academics should be treated the same way as journalists, but deciding that the privilege was
inapplicable for other reasons (citing Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938))).
314
See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436-37 (10th Cir. 1977) (citing
Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452).
315
See In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct Involving File No. 17139, 720
N.W.2d 807, 816 (Minn. 2006).
316
See Schiller v. City of New York, 245 F.R.D. 112, 118-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Builders Ass’n of Greater Chi. v. Cnty. of Cook, No. 96-1121, 1998 WL 111702, at *4-5 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 12, 1998).
317
Von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 143.
318
I don’t count the district court and court of appeals decisions in Stanford Daily
v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff’d, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev’d,
436 U.S. 547 (1978), because they were reversed, and because it isn’t clear which model they adopted. The decisions addressed whether searches of newspaper premises violated the Fourth Amendment, id. at 125-26, so the courts had no occasion to decide
whether they would have reached the same result as to the search of the office of a
would-be book author or a creator of non–mass communications speech, such as pick-
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LeGrand court rejected a newsgatherer’s privilege claim raised by
someone researching a book about a mafia family, reasoning:
Under these facts, I conclude that the author’s interest in protecting
the confidential information is manifestly less compelling than that of a
journalist or newsman. To report the news and remain valuable to their
employer and the public, professional journalists must constantly cultivate sources of information. Newsmen must also maintain their credibility and trustworthiness as repositories of confidential information.
However, appellant, like most authors, is an independent contractor whose success invariably depends more on the researching of public and private documents, other treatises, and background interviews,
rather than on confidential rapport with his sources of information.
Thus, his contacts with confidential sources, being minimal vis-a-vis
those of an investigative journalist, would be far less likely to have any
impact on the free flow of information which the First Amendment is
designed to protect.
The court defers comment at this time with respect to some future
situation in which an author’s role would be clearly that of an investiga319
tive journalist whose work product will be published in book form.

The court thus distinguished “professional journalist[s]” from those
who are only one-time authors, endorsing the press-as-industryspecially-protected approach. But I know of no other newsgatherer’s
privilege cases that take this view.
State statutes—whether related to newsgatherer’s privileges, retractions in libel cases, campaign finance law, or other subjects—often do
single out the institutional media, and sometimes even just certain seg320
ments of the media. But such line drawing is part of what legislators
do. When the broad constitutional language “freedom . . . of the press”
is involved, courts deciding journalist’s privilege cases have been unwilling to distinguish the press-as-industry from other newsgatherers.

eting or in-person speeches. And while the district court did reject the view “that
newspapers, reporters and photographers have no greater Fourth Amendment protections than other citizens,” id. at 133-34, it spoke more broadly of the principle that
“[t]he First Amendment is not superfluous,” id. The court didn’t argue that the Free
Press Clause “is not superfluous,” and thus that the Clause provides special protection
to the press-as-industry that the rest of the First Amendment denies to other speakers.
Indeed, the court cited, among other cases, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958),
which protected an organization that was not part of the press-as-industry. 353 F.
Supp. at 134.
319
People v. LeGrand, 415 N.Y.S.2d 252, 257-58 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
320
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4320(4) (West 1999) (defining reporter narrowly by requiring a large time commitment and future large-scale public dissemination of the work).
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B. Communicative Torts
Many communicative torts decisions in the lower courts have con321
tinued to follow the all-speakers-equal model.
Moreover, most of
the lower court cases that have departed from this approach have
done so with regard to speech that was never intended for mass dis322
semination, such as credit reports, employer references related to
323
324
ex-employees, complaints about a franchisee sent to a franchisor,
325
complaints sent to the government, business responses to customer
326
complaints, people talking to their coworkers, supervisors, or neigh321

See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 219 n.13 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S.
Ct. 1207 (2011); Flamm v. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Women, 201 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir.
2000); In re IBP Confidential Bus. Docs. Litig., 797 F.2d 632, 642 (8th Cir. 1986); Garcia v. Bd. of Educ., 777 F.2d 1403, 1410 (10th Cir. 1985); Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637,
649 (3rd Cir. 1980); Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Doe v.
Alaska Superior Ct., 721 P.2d 617, 628 (Alaska 1986); Antwerp Diamond Exch. of Am.
v. Better Bus. Bureau, 637 P.2d 733, 734 (Ariz. 1981); Miller v. Nestande, 237 Cal. Rptr.
359, 364 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011, 1022 n.23 (D.C.
1990); Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 808 (Fla. 1984); Rodriguez v. Nishiki, 653
P.2d 1145, 1149-50 (Haw. 1982); Kennedy v. Sheriff of E. Baton Rouge, 935 So. 2d 669,
677-78 (La. 2006); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d 688, 695 (Md. 1976); Shaari v.
Harvard Student Agencies, Inc., 691 N.E.2d 925, 928-29 (Mass. 1998); Henry v. Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775, 784 (Mo. 1985); Williams v. Pasma, 656 P.2d 212, 216-17
(Mont. 1982); Wheeler v. Neb. State Bar Ass’n, 508 N.W.2d 917, 921 (Neb. 1993);
Berkery v. Estate of Stuart, 988 A.2d 1201, 1208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010);
Poorbaugh v. Mullen, 653 P.2d 511, 520 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); Gross v. N.Y. Times Co.,
724 N.Y.S.2d 16, 17 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (endorsing Hammerhead Enters. v. Brezenoff, 551 F. Supp. 1360, 1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), which contains a more detailed First
Amendment discussion); Wampler v. Higgins, 752 N.E.2d 962, 972 (Ohio 2001);
DeCarvalho v. daSilva, 414 A.2d 806, 813 (R.I. 1980); Trigg v. Lakeway Publishers, 720
S.W.2d 69, 75 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986); Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1989);
Long v. Egnor, 346 S.E.2d 778, 783 (W. Va. 1986); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 580B cmt. e (1977).
322
See, e.g., Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 438 F.2d 433, 437 (3d Cir. 1971);
Greenmoss Builders v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 461 A.2d 414, 417-18 (Vt. 1983), aff’d on
other grounds, 472 U.S. 749 (1985), but overruled in part on other grounds by Lent v. Huntoon, 470 A.2d 1162 (Vt. 1983).
323
See, e.g., Vinson v. Linn-Mar Cmty. Sch. Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108, 118 (Iowa 1984);
Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Minn. 1980); Berg v. Cons.
Freightways, Inc., 421 A.2d 831, 834 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Calero v. Del Chem. Corp.,
228 N.W.2d 737, 745-46 (Wis. 1975).
324
See, e.g., Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359, 1362-65
(Or. 1977), reaffirmed in Wheeler v. Green, 593 P.2d 777 (Or. 1979).
325
See, e.g., Swengler v. ITT Corp. Electro-Optical Prods. Div., 993 F.2d 1063, 1071
n.5 (4th Cir. 1993). The court did not consider the possibility that such speech should
have been fully protected by the Petition Clause, even if not by the Free Speech Clause.
326
Perry v. Cosgrove, 464 So. 2d 664, 665 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). Perry actually involved a newspaper and a newspaper editor as defendants, but the court concluded that their speech—sending a letter to a customer in response to a complaint—
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327

bors, and the like. So though such cases often say they are drawing
a media/nonmedia distinction, their results could be consistent with
the mass-communications-more-protected view, and not just the pressas-industry-specially-protected view.
Indeed, some cases rejecting the all-speakers-equal model expressly hold that nonmedia speakers should be as protected as the media
when they speak through the media—for instance, through letters to
the editor or as people interviewed for news stories. This perspective
328
fits well within the mass-communications-more-protected view.
I could find only a handful of cases holding that ordinary citizens
get less First Amendment protection than press-as-industry speakers
would, even when the ordinary citizens are communicating to the
public. Most of these cases deny nonmedia defendants the benefit of
the prohibition—established by the Supreme Court’s holding in Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc.—on awards of presumed damages in the absence
329
of a showing of “actual malice.”

was not as protected as speech intended for mass communication. Id. Perry’s reasoning seems inconsistent with Nodar v. Galbreath, which rejected the press-as-industryspecially-protected view. See Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 808 (Fla. 1984) (“We
believe . . . that the constitutionally protected right to discuss, comment upon, criticize, and debate . . . is extended not only to the organized media but to all persons.”).
Since Perry doesn’t cite Nodar, it is possible that the parties and the court were unaware
of Nodar, which was decided less than three months before the decision in Perry, and
likely after the briefing in Perry was complete.
327
See, e.g., Schomer v. Smidt, 170 Cal. Rptr. 662, 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), disapproved by Miller v. Nestande, 237 Cal. Rptr. 359 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Williams v. Cont’l
Airlines, Inc., 943 P.2d 10, 18 (Colo. App. 1996); Battista v. United Illuminating Co.,
523 A.2d 1356, 1361 n.5 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987); Columbia Sussex Corp. v. Hay, 627
S.W.2d 270, 277 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
328
See, e.g., Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1175 n.21 (S.D.
Cal. 1999) (applying same standard to a nonmedia defendant doctor as to media defendants because the doctor’s statements were published through the media), rev’d on
other grounds, 264 F.3d 832, 847 (9th Cir. 2001); Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,
544 N.W.2d 21, 26 n.5 (Minn. 1996) (“Because Tatone’s communication utilized the
television media, we place her in the same legal position . . . as we place [the media
defendants].”); Pollnow v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, 486 N.Y.S.2d 11, 16 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1985) (“Whatever may be the rule with respect to purely private defamations having no nexus to the public media, we conclude, as have virtually all State and lower
Federal Courts passing on the issue . . . that a nonmedia individual defendant who utilizes a public medium for the publication of matter deemed defamatory should be accorded the same constitutional privilege as the medium itself.” (citation omitted)); see
also Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publ’g Co., 465 A.2d 953, 962-63 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1983) (reaching a similar result, though chiefly because of journalists’ right to gather
news from non-press-as-industry speakers and the public’s right to hear such speakers).
329
418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974).
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1. Political Advertisements and Letters to the Editor
Fleming v. Moore concluded that a real estate developer who
bought a newspaper ad to criticize a citizen opponent of a development project was a “non-media defendant,” and thus wasn’t protected
330
under Gertz. (This sort of speaker would be the analog of the signers of the ad in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, if Sullivan had been a
private figure.) Wheeler v. Green held the same as to a racehorse owner
who sent a letter to the editor of a horse racing newsletter, alleging
331
Similarly, Johnson v.
that a horse trainer had behaved unethically.
Clark denied Gertz protection to the author of a letter to the editor of a
newspaper complaining about an attorney’s alleged mishandling of
332
the estate of the author’s uncle.
2. Books and Authors’ Own Websites
Lassiter v. Lassiter treated a self-published author—a woman who
wrote a book accusing her ex-husband of physical abuse and adultery—as a nonmedia defendant, and held that only “media defendants” could assert First Amendment defenses to private figures’ def333
amation claims. Because of this, the court concluded that the First
330

275 S.E.2d 632, 638 (Va. 1981). Fleming was a real estate developer who was
trying to develop a tract; Moore was a neighbor who spoke out against the application
at local Planning Commission and Board of Supervisors meetings. Id. at 634. Fleming
responded by buying a newspaper ad captioned “RACISM,” which asserted that Moore
(who was white) opposed the development because it would likely have many black
residents. Id. at 634 & n.3.
In this case, the court held that even presumed damages were unavailable as a
matter of state law because the statement wasn’t actionable per se (i.e., didn’t accuse
the plaintiff of a crime or conduct incompatible with proper performance of his profession). Id. at 636-67. But the broader holding was that presumed damages could be
awarded in some libel cases (those that fit the state-law libel per se rules) brought by
private figure plaintiffs against nonmedia defendants, even without a showing of “actual malice.” Id.
331
593 P.2d 777, 784, 787-89 (Or. 1979). The court held that punitive damages in
defamation cases were foreclosed by the Oregon Constitution, but allowed the recovery of presumed damages. Id. at 788-89.
332
484 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1250-51, 1254 (M.D. Fla. 2007). Johnson didn’t cite Gertz
directly, didn’t discuss the First Amendment, and didn’t cite the Florida Supreme
Court’s opinion in Nodar v. Galbreath, which rejected any media/nonmedia distinction.
See Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 808 (Fla. 1984) (“If common-law remedies for
defamation are to be constitutionally restricted [under Gertz] in actions against media
defendants, they should also be restricted in actions against private, non-media speakers and publishers.”). Rather, Johnson relied on only two pre-Gertz cases and a post-Gertz
Florida Court of Appeals case that didn’t discuss the media/nonmedia distinction.
333
456 F. Supp. 2d 876, 881 (E.D. Ky. 2006), aff’d per curiam, 280 Fed. App’x 503
(6th Cir. 2008).
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Amendment did not bar holding the defendant strictly liable for
false and defamatory factual assertions, notwithstanding the Gertz v.
334
Robert Welch, Inc. rule that barred such strict liability in many cases.
Likewise, Ben-Tech Industrial Automation v. Oakland University treated
a professor as a nonmedia defendant with regard to material posted
on his website, and thus didn’t apply the Gertz requirement that punitive and presumed damages be awarded only on a showing of “ac335
tual malice.”
334

The court ultimately concluded that the defendant’s speech was either true or
mere opinion and thus not actionable under Kentucky law. 456 F. Supp. 2d at 879, 882.
The court might have reached the same First Amendment result—that strict liability
might be allowed if the statements were proven to be false factual assertions—another
way. The court concluded that the speech was “about a matter that is not of public interest,” id. at 880, which is consistent with the plurality view in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 & n.7 (1985) (plurality opinion), which gave
as an example of speech on matters of purely private concern a false claim that a
neighbor is a “whore.” Dun & Bradstreet in turn had held that speech on non-publicconcern matters was not covered by the Gertz rule that presumed punitive damages
could be awarded even in the absence of “actual malice.” And the logic of Dun &
Bradstreet may be read to suggest that statements that are not of “public concern” are
likewise not covered by the Gertz prohibition on strict liability. Compare, e.g., Sleem v.
Yale Univ., 843 F. Supp. 57, 63-64 (M.D.N.C. 1993) (so interpreting Gertz), Ross v.
Bricker, 770 F. Supp. 1038, 1043-44 (D.V.I. 1991) (suggesting that Gertz might be so
interpreted), and Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490, 1505 n.21
(D.D.C. 1987) (likewise), with L. Cohen & Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 629 F. Supp.
1425, 1431 (D. Conn. 1986) (suggesting the contrary). Nonetheless, this was not the
reasoning that the Lassiter court used to decide that the First Amendment protections
did not apply; rather, it limited those protections to “public officials and public figures
and/or against media defendants.”
335
See No. 247471, 2005 WL 50131, *6-7 & n.9 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2005)
(concluding that “[t]he actual malice standard d[id] not apply,” but rather a negligence standard did, since the case “involv[ed] a private plaintiff, a non-media defendant, and alleged defamatory statements regarding a private matter”). The court didn’t
cite Gertz, but its articulation of the First Amendment rules suggested that it was considering whether the Gertz rule was applicable here. The result might have been the
same regardless of whether the defendant was a media defendant, because Dun &
Bradstreet—which the court also didn’t cite—had held that speech on “private matter[s]” was not covered by the Gertz rule. But I include the case in this Section because
the court did rely on the defendant’s status as a “non-media” entity.
The professor posted a student paper that happened to contain defamatory allegations as an example for other students, apparently without the intent of endorsing the
allegations. This might conceivably be seen as speech that’s not part of mass communications because it is addressed only to a small audience (even though it was theoretically available to everyone on the Internet). Id. at *1. But the court didn’t rely on any
such argument, and instead simply stated that the First Amendment libel rules are for
press-as-industry defendants alone. Id. at *6 n.8.
The defendant didn’t raise, see Brief on Appeal of Defendant-Appellee Donald O.
Mayer, Ben-Tech Indus. Automation, No. 247471, 2005 WL 25531938, and the court
didn’t discuss a possible defense under 47 U.S.C. § 230, which has been held to im-
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3. Quoted Statements to the Media
Five cases have held that people who spoke to the media did not
have the full First Amendment protection that the media itself had,
even though the speakers were expressing their views through mass
communications technology. Stokes v. CBS, Inc. so held with regard to
on-camera interviews “built around the statements of” the defendant,
336
a detective investigating a case.
Denny v. Mertz reached the same
conclusion about a defendant’s statement to a reporter about why the
defendant—the CEO of a large company—had fired the plaintiff, his
337
general counsel.
Guilbeaux v. Times of Acadiana, Inc. also came to the same conclusion regarding a casino developer’s statements to a newspaper about

munize online speakers from liability when they choose to post material provided by
others. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a
listserv and website operator is immunized from liability for posting an allegedly defamatory email authored by a third party).
336
25 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1000-01 (D. Minn. 1998). The exact effect of the detective’s nonmedia status wasn’t entirely clear, but it seems to have been that the detective
could be held liable for compensatory damages, even without a showing of negligence,
so long as he acted out of “actual ill-will or a design causelessly and wantonly to injure
plaintiff.” Id. at 1002 (quoting Bol v. Cole, 561 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Minn. 1997)). The
court specifically held that “on [the] issue of [presumed or punitive] damages, private
parties ‘utiliz[ing] the television media’ are placed ‘in the same legal position’ as media defendants.” Id. at 1003 (third alteration in original) (quoting Richie v. Paramount Picture Corp., 544 N.W.2d 21, 26 n.5 (Minn. 1996)).
Likewise, in Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, No. 11-0057, 2011 WL 5999334 (D.
Or. Nov. 30, 2011)—a case that came too late to be included in the text—the court
concluded that a blogger who published a blog that was sharply critical of plaintiff was
not a member of the “media,” and thus not entitled to the Gertz rule that “plaintiffs
cannot recover damages without proof that defendant was at least negligent and may
not recover presumed damages absent proof of ‘actual malice.’” Id. at *5. In the
court’s view, Gertz extended only to speakers as to whom there was some
evidence of (1) any education in journalism; (2) any credentials or proof of any
affiliation with any recognized news entity; (3) proof of adherence to journalistic
standards such as editing, fact-checking, or disclosures of conflicts of interest;
(4) keeping notes of conversations and interviews conducted; (5) mutual understanding or agreement of confidentiality between the defendant and his/her
sources; (6) creation of an independent product rather than assembling writings
and postings of others; or (7) contacting “the other side” to get both sides of a
story. Without evidence of this nature, defendant is not “media.”
Id.
337

See 318 N.W.2d 141, 152-53 (Wisc. 1982) (“[W]e do not read Gertz as requiring
that the protections provided therein apply to non-media defendants nor . . . do we
consider it good public policy to so decide.”).
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338

another casino developer.
Kanaga v. Gannett Co. held the same
about a patient’s statements to the media accusing a doctor of rec339
And Landrum v. Board of
ommending unnecessary hysterectomies.
Commissioners suggested that any possible First Amendment barriers to
tort lawsuits for disclosure of allegedly private facts (there, that a po340
lice officer had failed a marijuana test ) did not apply to a nonmedia
341
defendant who had conveyed the information to newspapers.
4. Nonmedia Defendants Generally
The Florida Supreme Court’s standard jury instructions expressly
342
put the burden of proving truth on nonmedia defendants, even
though Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps requires that the burden
of proving falsehood be placed on plaintiffs in cases with media de343
fendants involving matters of public concern. The comments to the
344
instructions seem to treat “media defendant” as meaning “a member
345
of the press or broadcast media,” which suggests that the court was
endorsing the press-as-industry-specially-protected view.

338

693 So. 2d 1183, 1188 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Sassone v. Elder, 626 So. 2d
345, 351 (La. 1993)).
339
687 A.2d 173, 181-82 (Del. 1996). A later decision in the same case concluded
that Kanaga was a nonmedia defendant despite her having written several articles in
the past, and “her (unsuccessful) efforts to publish an article about [the incident giving rise to the libel lawsuit] in a magazine.” No. 92C-12-182-JOH, 1998 WL 729585, at
*4 (Del. Super. Ct. July 10, 1998), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 750 A.2d 1174 (Del. 2000).
340
685 So. 2d 382, 386 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
341
Id. at 392 (“We reject the [Orleans Levee Board]’s argument that Mr. Landrum
must show actual malice in order to recover from the [Board] for an invasion of privacy. While such a requirement has been discussed in cases involving media defendants,
we find nothing in Louisiana law to suggest that a non-media defendant can only be
liable for an invasion of privacy involving a falsehood.” (citations omitted)).
342
See In re Standard Jury Instructions (Civil Cases 89-1), 575 So. 2d 194, 197-200
(Fla. 1991) (per curiam). The court noted that “our approval for publication is not an
adjudication on the merits of the form, substance, or correctness of the instructions
nor an approval of the notes and comments of the committee. Any litigant, in an appropriate forum, may raise any issue in connection with their use.” Id. at 195 (quoting
In re Standard Jury Instructions (Civil Cases 88-2), 541 So. 2d 90, 90 (Fla. 1989) (per
curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, the court appears to suggest that the instructions are a sound statement of the law. See id. (“We . . . decline the
invitation of respondents to remand to the Committee for reconsideration of the [legal issues] raised.”).
343
475 U.S. 767, 775-77 (1986). The court in Hepps specifically noted that it was
not deciding whether the same standard would apply to nonmedia defendants. Id. at
779 n.4.
344
575 So. 2d at 199-200.
345
Id. at 195.
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Finally, Senna v. Florimont concluded that the inquiry into whether
speech is on a matter of public concern for First Amendment libel law
purposes should have a separate subprong for media defendants: if
“published by a media or media-related defendant, a news story concerning public health and safety, a highly regulated industry, or allegations of criminal or consumer fraud or a substantial regulatory violation will, by definition, involve a matter of public interest or con346
But it seems very likely that any item published through
concern.”
mass communications technology about those subjects, whether by
the media or otherwise, would indeed be found to be on a matter of
347
public concern. And the court gave commercial advertising—which
is generally a less protected category of speech, and which was the
speech at issue in the case itself—as one example of non-public348
concern speech. So it seems unlikely that the media/nonmedia distinction would in practice play a significant role under the Senna rule.
C. Antidiscrimination Law
Four dissenters in Associated Press v. NLRB (1937) took the view
that the Free Press Clause secured the Associated Press’s right to re349
fuse to employ union members as writers. And the Washington Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc.
350
seemed to follow that dissent.
Washington state law bars employers from discriminating against
351
employees based on their political activities.
The Tacoma-based

346

958 A.2d 427, 443-44 (N.J. 2008).
Indeed, the court in Senna specifically stated that “speech concerning significant risks to public health and safety” would always qualify as involving a matter of public concern. Id. at 444.
348
Id. In fact, the Third Circuit, which includes New Jersey, has held that traditional First Amendment libel analysis doesn’t apply to cases brought based on commercial advertisements. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898
F.2d 914, 931-33 (3d Cir. 1990). Another district court case out of the Third Circuit,
Fanelle v. Lojack Corp., likewise held that “in defamation cases involving commercial
speech by non-media defendants about private individuals, even when that speech
touches on matters of public concern, the speech is not entitled to elevated levels of
First Amendment protection, and therefore proof of falsity [under Hepps] is not required.” 29 Med. L. Rep. 1513, 1521 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
349
301 U.S. 103, 136-41 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting); see also supra subsection VI.B.2.
350
See 936 P.2d 1123, 1128-33 (Wash. 1997) (holding that “editorial control is a
necessary component of the free press and a state law infringing thereon will be unconstitutional as applied”).
351
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.680 (West 2006).
347
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News Tribune demoted a reporter for violating the newspaper’s policy
barring “high profile political activity” by its reporters, and the report352
er sued. The court concluded that the dismissal did violate the state
statute, but the statute couldn’t be applied in this case because it conflicted with the newspaper’s First Amendment right to “editorial control,” which included control over who would write for its newspa353
Associated Press v. NLRB, the court held, was “limited to the
per.
354
[National Labor Relations Act] and union activity.”
But it’s not clear whether the Nelson decision falls in the allspeakers-equal” category, the mass-communications-more-protected
category, or the press-as-industry-specially-protected category.
Though the decision often mentions “free press” rights, it also often
refers to “free speech” rights and “First Amendment” rights. The
355
main precedent it relies on, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
though a newspaper case, has been equally applied to non-press-asindustry speech, such as a business’s right to choose what to include in
356
its mailings, and non-mass-communications speech, such as a parade
357
organizer’s right to choose the floats that appear in its parade. And
the logic of the Tornillo opinion would likewise apply to a political
campaign’s or political advocacy group’s choice of employees who
would give speeches on behalf of the organization.
In fact, today the strongest precedent for securing some First
Amendment exemption from antidiscrimination laws is a nonmedia
case, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, which held that the Boy Scouts of
America has a First Amendment right to bar gays from being scout358
masters.
The job of a scoutmaster, the Court noted, is to “incul352

Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1125.
Id. at 1131.
354
Id. at 1132.
355
See 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding that a state statute granting a political
candidate the right to answer a newspaper’s criticism in print violates the First
Amendment).
356
See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (“The concerns that caused us to invalidate the compelled access
rule in Tornillo apply to appellant as well as to the institutional press. See First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 425 U.S., at 782-84. Cf. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S., at 452.”). Justice Marshall’s concurrence in the judgment did not note any disagreement with the
plurality on this matter. Id. at 21-26.
357
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 57576 (1995).
358
530 U.S. 640, 651 (2000). Cases holding that religious organizations have a
right to discriminate in choice of clergy under the Free Exercise Clause might also offer an analogy, though more distant because they do not directly involve “the freedom
of the speech, or of the press.” See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455,
353
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cate . . . values . . . both expressly and by example,” and because the
organization opposes homosexuality, allowing openly gay scoutmasters would interfere with the Boy Scouts’ ability to convey its mes360
The Court thus seems committed to protecting, to some exsage.
tent, organizations’ right to control their message by choosing those
who speak on their behalf—the same right the newspaper asserted in
Nelson. Likewise, the three other lower court cases recognizing First
Amendment exemptions from antidiscrimination laws involved speakers who were not part of the press-as-industry: Ku Klux Klan parade
361
362
organizers and Nation of Islam organizers of single-sex lectures.
It’s not clear whether the rulings in Boy Scouts and the lower court
cases would extend to employment discrimination, in which people’s
livelihoods are at stake, and not just to the selection of group members, volunteers, marchers, and audience members. But Boy Scouts
and the other cases show that speaking organizations are likely to have
at least as strong a First Amendment right to discriminate as do printing organizations. Following Boy Scouts, then, any cases that track Nel363
son are likely to follow the all-speakers-equal model.
D. Access to Government Operations and
Government and Private Property
The lower court cases that discuss whether the press is constitutionally entitled to special access to government operations or to private property generally follow the Court’s all-speakers-equal hold364
ings.
Many courts do provide special access to the media, whether
461-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause bars judicial review of a
church’s employment decisions); Young v. N. Ill. Conf. of United Methodist Church,
21 F.3d 184, 187 (7th Cir. 1994) (same); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian
Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1991) (same); Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122,
1126-28 (Colo. 1996) (same); see also Empl. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990)
(suggesting that the Free Exercise Clause might mandate exemptions from generally
applicable laws if it is linked with a freedom of association claim).
359
Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 649-50.
360
Id. at 653.
361
Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor of Thurmont, 700
F. Supp. 281, 289-90 (D. Md. 1988).
362
City of Cleveland v. Nation of Islam, 922 F. Supp. 56, 59 (N.D. Ohio 1995);
Donaldson v. Farrakhan, 762 N.E.2d 835, 841 (Mass. 2002).
363
I have found no post-Nelson case so far that tracks Nelson in allowing newspapers—or other speakers—to discriminate in choice of employees.
364
See, e.g., Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 221 F.3d 834, 840 (6th Cir. 2000)
(holding that journalists have no greater rights of access under the First Amendment
to city parking ticket records than does the public because “[t]he First Amendment
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365

television or print. But they generally do not hold that the press-asindustry has a constitutional right to such preferential treatment.
I could find only four possible exceptions to this principle, all
from 1971 to 1981, and all involving press exemptions from trespass
law and from laws that limit access to crime scenes. Two are New Jersey appellate cases. First, in Freedman v. New Jersey State Police, the court
interpreted the New Jersey Constitution’s Free Press Clause to hold
that reporters—including those from a university student newspaper—have a right to go into privately owned farmworker camps, not366
withstanding the property owners’ objections. Second, the court in
State v. Lashinsky stated that in various newsgathering contexts “the
reporter stands apart from the ordinary citizen,” though the court re367
fused to grant access to a crime scene in that particular case.
Two more are trial court cases from other jurisdictions. In People
v. Rewald, a New York trial court decided that a newspaper reporter
seeking access to a migrant labor camp had a First Amendment ex368
emption from trespass law. Likewise, the federal district court decision in Allen v. Combined Communications held that a “reporter” facing a
trespass claim should be immune from trespass law if (1) the reporter

does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not
available to the public generally” (alteration in original) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972))); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505,
520-22 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that journalists have no greater right than others to
trespass on private property (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669
(1991))); Belo Broad. Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 1981) (concluding
that “the press enjoys no constitutional right of physical access to courtroom exhibits,”
notwithstanding Justice Brennan’s suggestion in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555, 586 n.2 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment), that the press
might have special constitutional access rights); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 902 n.70 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (stating, in discussing a claimed
right “to copy video and audio tapes that had been received as exhibits in a public
criminal trial,” that “[u]nder the First Amendment, the press enjoys no greater access
rights than the public generally”); In re Attorney Gen.’s “Directive on Exit Polling:
Media and Non-Partisan Public Interest Groups,” 981 A.2d 64, 80 n.13 (N.J. 2009) (rejecting special access for the press to protected polling zones).
365
Likewise, some legislatures have chosen to provide the institutional media with
special access to other places, such as disaster areas. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §
409.5(d) (West 1999).
366
343 A.2d 148, 151 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975). An earlier case, State v.
Shack, suggested that this same result might be reached under state property law, 277
A.2d 369, 374 (N.J. 1971), but Freedman expressly relied on the New Jersey Constitution’s Free Press Clause, 343 A.2d at 150.
367
404 A.2d 1121, 1128 (N.J. 1979) (quoting In re Farber, 394 A.2d 330, 350 (N.J.
1978) (Handler, J., dissenting)).
368
318 N.Y.S.2d 40, 45 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 1971).
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was unaware that he was trespassing, and (2) the property owner suf369
fered no “damage as a result of the trespass.”
These holdings, though, are likely no longer sound—at least
where the federal First Amendment is concerned—after Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., which held that the press-as-industry gets no special
370
exemption from generally applicable laws.
This equal treatment
principle would presumably include trespass laws that bar unauthorized access to real property, given Cohen’s statements that “[t]he press
may not with impunity break and enter an office or dwelling to gather
news” and that the press gets no exemption from laws that bar unau371
thorized use of intellectual property.
Moreover, Marsh v. Alabama, on which Rewald relied, upheld Jehovah’s Witnesses’ right to distribute religious pamphlets in a company
town—not an activity obviously reserved to the press-as-industry—and
372
may well extend to non-press-as-industry speakers.
Likewise, Freedman relied on an earlier New Jersey Supreme Court decision that
carved out an exception from state trespass law not just for the press,
but also for public interest lawyers who were trying to help farmwork373
To the extent that Freedman constitutionalized this right of acers.
cess for the press under the New Jersey Constitution’s Free Press
Clause, its logic—coupled with the logic of the earlier decision—
suggests the same rule might apply to other speakers under the New
Jersey Constitution’s Free Speech Clause.
In any event, Freedman, Lashinsky, Rewald, and Allen are the only
cases that I have found that can be read as taking the press-as-industryspecially-protected view. And even in New Jersey—the one jurisdiction in which such decisions were handed down by appellate courts—

369

7 Med. L. Rep. 2417, 2420 (D. Colo. 1981); see also Garrett v. Estelle, 424 F.
Supp. 468, 471-72 (N.D. Tex.) (holding that the media had a right to videorecord an
execution), rev’d, 556 F.2d 1274, 1278 (5th Cir. 1977) (“The Constitution does not . . .
require government to accord the press special access to information not shared by
members of the public generally.” (citing Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850
(1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974))).
370
501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991).
371
Id. One could imagine different First Amendment rules for speakers’ claimed
right of access to unenclosed land than for speakers’ access to others’ dwellings or offices. But Cohen’s point that the press-as-industry gets no special exemptions from generally applicable laws, compared to the rights of other speakers, applies equally to both
kinds of trespass.
372
326 U.S. 501, 509-10 (1946).
373
State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372-75 (N.J. 1971).
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these cases have not seemed to produce further special constitutional
374
treatment for the press-as-industry.
E. Campaign Speech Restrictions
As discussed above, statutory media exemptions from most campaign finance laws have made it unnecessary for courts to decide
375
whether the media is constitutionally entitled to such an exemption.
Nonetheless, at least three lower court decisions have confronted the
question, and all adopted the all-speakers-equal position. The district
court decision in McConnell v. FEC upheld certain campaign speech
restrictions on the grounds that the Free Press Clause and Free
376
A fedSpeech Clause provide equivalent constitutional protection.
eral district court held that a city campaign finance ordinance that
lacked a media exemption could constitutionally be applied to the
377
And a Kentucky appellate court struck down certain cammedia.
paign speech restrictions, reasoning that a bar association had the same
right as a newspaper to publish judicial candidate endorsements, be378
cause the “freedom of the press and freedom of speech” belong to all.
The Federal Election Commission, however, seems to view the
federal election law media exemption—which is limited to broadcast379
380
ing and periodicals and thus excludes books, occasional newslet374

See, e.g., In re Attorney Gen.’s “Directive on Exit Polling: Media and NonPartisan Public Interest Groups,” 981 A.2d 64, 80 n.13 (N.J. 2009) (rejecting special
access for the press to protected polling zones); State v. Cantor, 534 A.2d 83, 86 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (rejecting special right for the press to violate laws against
impersonating public officials).
375
See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
376
McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 236 (D.D.C.) (per curiam), aff’d in
part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010); see also supra note 289.
377
Olson v. City of Golden, No. 07-1851, 2011 WL 3861433, at *9-10 (D. Colo.
Sept. 1, 2011) (holding that newspapers, like other speakers, had to comply with the
ordinance’s disclosure requirements and that “[i]n the absence of a press exemption
like that in the [Federal Election Campaign Act], a court simply applies the regulation
to the publisher of a specific publication”).
378
Ky. Registry of Election Fin. v. Louisville Bar Ass’n, 579 S.W.2d 622, 627 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1979) (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978)).
379
See supra note 274.
380
See, e.g., George Soros, MUR 5642, Statement of Reasons of Chairman Robert
D. Lenhard and Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub, at 2 (Fed. Election Comm’n Dec.
31, 2007), available at http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocsMUR/29044223685.pdf (describing proposed action against businessman George Soros for, among other things,
printing and distributing a book containing statements opposing the reelection of
George W. Bush and noting that the FEC general counsel—along with three commis-
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ters, and occasionally produced documentaries —as tracking a
First Amendment mandate. Implicitly, then, the FEC appears to be
taking a press-as-industry-specially-protected view of the First Amend383
ment. But I could find no court decision that agreed with the FEC
on this.
CONCLUSION
The historical evidence points powerfully in one direction—
throughout American history, the dominant understanding of the
“freedom of the press” has followed the press-as-technology model.
This was likely the original meaning of the First Amendment. It was
almost certainly the understanding when the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified. It remained the largely unchallenged orthodoxy until
about 1970.
Since 1970, a few lower courts have adopted the press-as-industry
model, but this has been a decidedly minority view. The Supreme
Court continues to provide equal treatment to speakers without resioners—considered such book publishing as outside the federal election law media
exemption); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Advisory Opinion 1987-8, at 5-6 (Fed. Election
Comm’n May 4, 1987), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1987-08.pdf (advising that the media exemption does not apply to books).
381
See, e.g., Me. Right to Life Comm., Inc., Advisory Opinion 1989-28, at 6 (Fed.
Election Comm’n Feb. 14, 1990), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/198928.pdf (advising that the media exemption does not apply to occasionally published
newsletters or nonprofit organizations); San Joaquin Valley Republican Assocs., Advisory Opinion 1988-22, at 3 (Fed. Election Comm’n July 5, 1988), available at
http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1988-22.pdf (advising that occasionally published
newsletters do not qualify for the media exemption).
382
See, e.g., Citizens United, Advisory Opinion 2004-30, at 7 (Fed. Election
Comm’n Sept. 10, 2004), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/2004-30.pdf
(stressing that Citizens United was not entitled to the media exemption because it
“does not regularly produce documentaries or pay to broadcast them on television”
and that “Citizens United has produced only two documentaries since its founding in
1988 . . . neither of which it paid to broadcast on television”). But see Citizens United,
Advisory Opinion 2010-08, at 5 (Fed. Election Comm’n June 11, 2010), available at
http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/AO%202010-08.pdf (advising that Citizens United
was entitled to the media exemption because it had by then produced a sufficient
number of documentaries).
383
See, e.g., Citizens United, Advisory Opinion 2010-08, at 3-5; Viacom, Inc., Advisory Opinion 2003-34, at 3 (Fed. Election Comm’n Dec. 19, 2003), available at
http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/2003-34.pdf. The Viacom opinion did say that “[t]he
Commission does not undertake a constitutional analysis in this advisory opinion,” but
said this was so because “the press exemptions at 2 U.S.C. 431(9)(B)(i) and
434(f)(3)(B)(i), [are] themselves clearly drawn with the First Amendment in mind.”
Id. at 4. This suggests that the FEC does itself see the First Amendment, like federal
election law, as embodying the press-as-industry-specially-protected view.
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gard to whether they are members of the press-as-industry. And
though several Supreme Court opinions have noted that the question
remains open, the bulk of the precedent points toward equal treatment for all speakers—or at least to equal treatment for all who use
mass communications technology, whether or not they are members
of the press-as-industry.
This evidence can prove valuable in interpreting the Free Press
384
385
Clause, to the extent we focus on its “purpose,” its “history,” the
386
long-term traditions of the American legal system, and precedent. It
also suggests how we should interpret the Clause to the extent we fo387
Appeals to the text that the Framers ratified are
cus on the “text.”
naturally affected by what that text meant when it was ratified.
“[T]ext and meaning ultimately are inseparable; to understand what
388
the Framers said, we inevitably seek to discover what they meant.”
Even Justices who do not broadly endorse originalism accept that original meaning evidence may be relevant to interpreting ambiguous le389
gal phrases, even if it is not dispositive.
And evidence of original meaning is especially valuable for assessing arguments based on the supposed literal meaning of an am384

See supra text accompanying note 4.
See supra Parts I-III. The more conservative Justices have of course long
stressed the significance of the historical understanding of constitutional provisions,
including the Free Speech Clause and the Free Press Clause. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 925-29 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Alito &
Thomas, JJ.); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 424 n.9 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 358-59
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
386
See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584-85 (2010) (stressing, in an
opinion joined by all the Justices except Justice Alito, the importance of considering
“histor[y] and tradition[]” when determining whether a particular exception to First
Amendment protection should be recognized (citation omitted)); Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (focusing on the value of considering traditions in the context of recognizing unenumerated rights); Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1450-51 (2009) (discussing Justice Scalia’s
occasional focus on post-Framing traditions, including in First Amendment cases).
387
See supra note 3.
388
Anderson, supra note 67, at 462.
389
See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 952 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ.); Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2778 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 274, 280-81
(2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 626 (2003) (Breyer, J., majority opinion); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 787-89
(1995) (Stevens, J., majority opinion); Minn. Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 583-84 (1983) (O’Connor, J., majority opinion).
385
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biguous text. By way of analogy, consider the Seventh Amendment,
which secures the right to civil jury trial in “Suits at common law.”
“Suits at common law” could refer to claims brought under AngloAmerican law as opposed to civil law, claims brought under judgemade law as opposed to statutory law, or claims that have been historically decided by courts of law as opposed to equity or admiralty.
Our legal system resolves this type of ambiguity not by adopting
the meaning most commonly used today—which is probably judgemade law as opposed to statutory law—but rather by considering how
the ambiguous phrase was originally understood (claims of a sort historically decided by courts of law, back when law, equity, and admiral390
ty courts were separate). The same reasoning applies to “the press.”
Arguments based on an ambiguous text should consider which of the
several possible meanings the text was originally understood to have.
Of course, the Supreme Court has never limited itself to analyzing
constitutional provisions based solely on historical sources. Justices
remain free to decide for themselves what they think best serves the
391
values they deem protected by constitutional provisions. The goal of
this Article is simply to say that an argument for a press-as-industry interpretation of the Free Press Clause must rely on something other
than original meaning, text, purpose, tradition, or precedent.

390

See, e.g., Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830) (looking to
Framing-era history in deciding that “[t]he phrase common law, found in this clause, is
used in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence”); see
also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974) (referring to the historical understanding of the Seventh Amendment as explained by the Court in Parsons); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 659 (6th Cir. 1996) (same).
391
Many scholars have discussed this question of First Amendment theory, and I
have nothing new to add to this debate. For articles supporting the press-as-industryspecially-protected view, see Dyk, supra note 6; Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005); Stewart, supra note 4; West, supra
note 6; and Glen S. Dresser, Note, First Amendment Protection Against Libel Actions: Distinguishing Media and Non-Media Defendants, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 902 (1974). For articles
supporting the mass-communications-more-protected view, see Robert D. Sack, Reflections on the Wrong Question: Special Constitutional Privilege for the Institutional Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 629, 633 (1979), which is perhaps limited to those speakers who publish
“regularly”; and John J. Watkins & Charles W. Schwartz, Gertz and the Common Law of
Defamation: Of Fault, Nonmedia Defendants and Conditional Privileges, 15 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 823 (1984). For articles supporting the all-speakers-equal view, see Anderson, supra note 9; Arlen W. Langvardt, Media Defendants, Public Concerns, and Public Plaintiffs:
Toward Fashioning Order from Confusion in Defamation Law, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 91 (1987);
Lange, supra note 17; Lewis, supra note 66; David W. Robertson, Defamation and the First
Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199 (1976); Steven
Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV.
915 (1978); and Van Alstyne, supra note 66.

